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20 June 1985

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ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

70TH GENOCIDE ANNIVERSARY COMMEMORATED IN FRANCE

Paris LE MONDE in French 26 Apr 85 p 4

[Text] The French-Armenian community, the largest in Western Europe with around 300,000 members, commemorated the 70th anniversary of the 1915 genocide in Turkey Wednesday, April 24. The genocide began with the arrest of intellectuals in Constantinople, followed by massacres and a massive deportation of the population which caused the deaths of several hundred thousand people.

Two demonstrations in particular took place in Paris towards the end of the afternoon: starting from the Etoile, one marched towards the consulate and the other towards the Turkish embassy. More than 3,000 people participated.

The new cardinal in Lyon, the archbishop Monseigneur Decourtray, concelebrated a service with representatives of the Armenian apostolic church at the Saint John primatial. "The ruthlessness and coldness indicated by the numbers involved in the genocide", the prelate declared, "is frightening. Justice demands a reparation. But how can the means of this reparation be considered if the facts are not acknowledged? The Federal Republic of Germany has just given a fine example to the world by condemning those who deny the existence of Nazi exactions against the Jews. Justice demands that the Armenian people, despite the terrible human and territorial amputation they suffered in 1915, live and take their place once more among the nations and civilizations of the world".

A press conference was organized in Paris by the Dachnak movement (Armenian Revolutionary Federation, which tags itself "socialist"). Its organizers mentioned their "strong presumption" that the Turkish government "at least inspired, if not carried out" the attacks and abductions perpetrated against some of their leaders in Beirut these last few months - most recently on April 23.

More generally, mention was made of the intense pressures exerted by Turkey on other European governments, especially on Paris, in order to sway any attitudes favorable to "the Armenian cause". According to Henri Papazian, Dachnak's spokesman, these pressures have been partially successful, in Paris at least, since obstacles were put in the way of certain demonstrations planned for the 70th anniversary commemoration (the symbolic laying of the first stone of a commemorative monument in Canada Square was not authorized).

The organization of separate demonstrations in the capital was explained by the fact that the community as a whole does not share Dachnak's views on the necessity of obtaining not only Turkey's acknowledgement of the 1915 genocide as a fact*, but also the Armenians' right to full restitution of territories historically plundered, first by Russia, then by Turkey.

Louis Mermaz, president of the national assembly, forwarded a telegram to Dachnak expressing his "sympathy and solidarity" on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the 1915 massacres.

Roland Dumas, minister of foreign affairs, stated that France "regrets the Turkish government's interpretation of the events of 1915, but cannot hold it responsible for acts committed 70 years ago".

* Ankara has always denied the reality of the "genocide". According to them, there was a massive deportation of the population for reasons of military security; Turkey admits only that, during this transfer, tens, even hundreds of thousands of Armenians died, essentially of illnesses.

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CSO: 4619/48

EGYPT

SUPPORT GIVEN TO PLO IN AAPSO CONFLICT WITH LIBYA

Nicosia FALASTIN AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 13 Apr 85 pp 42-43

/Interview with Ahmad Hamrush by Mazin Bakr; "Ahmad Hamrush and Circumstances Surrounding Libyan Crisis in AAPSO. If PLO Seat Is Vacated Once, Afro-Asian Solidarity Will Lose Its Meaning"; date and place not specified

/Text On the 20th of last March, the Arab Teachers Federation wound up its meeting in Libya with the participation of an official PLO delegation. Four days later, however, the Libyan Government protested the participation of the PLO delegation in the meetings of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization /AAPSO scheduled to be held in Libya.

Negotiations that last 48 hours between AAPSO and Libyan authorities came to a dead end. The Libyans insisted on overstepping the role of the "host country" to interfere in determining which delegations should participate while AAPSO insisted on clinging to its independence and on nonviolation of its constitution.

Following the collapse of the negotiations, we had an interview with Mr Ahmad Hamrush, chairman of the Egyptian solidarity committee, which had nominated him for AAPSO's presidency, to talk about the dilemma that prevented the holding of the 13th presidency council meeting in Banghazi from 25 to 29 March 1985.

/Question Mr Ahmad Hamrush, what crisis did the 13th presidential council meeting of AAPSO encounter that prevented its convocation?

/Answer What happened is that we, in the Egyptian delegation, were looking forward to our visit to Libya in particular and to our participation in the presidential council's meeting in Banghazi. We had a feeling that this meeting would play an important role in bolstering relations between the Libyan solidarity committee and the Egyptian solidarity committee, which began in the wake of the Egyptian delegation's visit to Libya last February, and in arriving at a joint agreement and also in issuing a joint communique as well.

But what happened at Larnaca Airport /in Cyprus, where the Palestinian delegation was asked to disembark and report to the passport office with a view to preventing their departure, prompted us to adopt a position of principle. We are in solidarity with the PLO delegation because a solidarity conference cannot be held without the presence of the legitimate representation of the Palestinian revolution, which is represented by the PLO.

Therefore, all the delegations were quick to express their solidarity with the Palestinian delegation, disembarking from the airplane until the matter was settled with the Libyan brothers.

This firm, principled stand by the Egyptian delegation as well as all the other delegations expressed the spirit of the solidarity movement. AAPSO is the organization that invites and determines who is going to participate in its conferences and the host country has no right to interfere in the character or makeup of the participating delegations.

/Question/ There was great surprise and amazement at Libya's last-minute stand shortly before the airplane took off. But was there, in view of sensitive Libyan-PLO relations, prior arrangements to guarantee the arrival of the Palestinian delegation in Benghazi? And, was Libyan approval in this matter obtained?

/Answer/ The permanent secretariat of the solidarity organization was supposed to have obtained prior approval and to have informed the brothers in Libya and the Palestinians as well that the PLO delegation may include all tendencies and all forces, even those who are in disagreement with each other, as happened at the sixth conference in Algiers. This conference was held in May 1984 at a time when the PLO was experiencing internal conflicts and when difficulties in convening the Palestine National Council /PNC/ and the executive committees meeting were being encountered. Nonetheless, the PLO was represented by one delegation headed by Abu Mazin and Mahmud 'Abbas, with 'Abd-al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar as a member, for example.

What I mean is that internal conflicts between Palestinian forces and factions do not preclude the representation of the Palestinian revolution by one delegation and we are not against this delegation including all the forces that represent themselves. What we object to, though, is the absence of the Palestinian revolution which is represented by the PLO.

/Question/ Do you have any information about whether the Libyan authorities replied affirmatively to the secretariat's notification that a PLO delegation was attending?

/Answer/ Libya's reply to AAPSO's demand for the participation of a PLO delegation was that the Libyans' principled stand was to reject the participation of a Palestinian delegation.

/Question/ Was that during preparation for the meeting?

/Answer/ No, it was during the negotiations which took place while the airplane was on the ground, with the delegates' luggage inside it, that lasted until 3 am, and then after our arrival at the hotels while our luggage was left in the plane.

All these negotiations were held under abnormal circumstances. Nevertheless, the Libyan position was clear and did not change in regard to their refusal to accept the participation of the PLO delegation.

/Question/ What I meant was notification during preparation for the meeting.

/Answer/ The truth is that this is the responsibility of AAPSO. It is the one that does the inviting and the host country only acts as host, for the one who calls for, prepares for and invites to the conference is AAPSO. No country has the right to interfere in the attendance of any of these delegations or else another country will have the right to object to the presence of a Libyan delegation, for instance, thus opening the door to a process of "vetoes" that violate the organization's constitution, which does not at all allow any country to object to the participation of another country or a revolutionary liberation movement such as the Palestinian revolution.

/Question/ In light of the Libyan position, AAPSO had a clear choice between two things: either not to go to Benghazi and cancel the conference or to exclude the PLO.

/Answer/ We opposed the exclusion of the Palestinian revolution as we categorically object to the Palestinian seat being vacant in any of the AAPSO meetings. AAPSO was originally set up in 1955 to lend support to national liberation movements, so how can the largest national liberation movement, the Palestinian revolution, be excluded from this meeting, especially since such movements in the world are limited right now. There are only four liberation movements, so how can the AAPSO presidential body meet with the largest liberation movement not in attendance?

/Question/ What about the compromise proposed by some?

/Answer/ Which is?

/Question/ To ask the PLO, the affected party, to choose to attend or not attend, to stay away from Benghazi voluntarily for "consideration of locale" this time only. I heard that the ones who made this proposal felt that this did not violate the PLO's right to membership in AAPSO and to participation in other meetings.

/Answer/ As I have already said, the Egyptian delegation did not and will not agree to the absence of the Palestinian revolution and to its seat being vacant because of existing conflicts. There was a proposal not to have present the PLO or any other Palestinian delegation, but we did not agree to this because we believe that a vacant Palestinian seat in any AAPSO meeting robs it of its legitimacy, its constitutionality, its entity and its role.

/Question/ Do you support the claim that equating the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, with any other Palestinian force or side, is the first step toward challenging the organization's legitimacy and aiding in the creation of an alternate organization?

/Answer/ Our clear position is to have a delegation representing the PLO made up of members chosen by the PLO itself. The PLO agreed to include in its delegation opposition figures who hold specific positions in the organization.

The question is to have a PLO delegation that includes all the various detachments in accordance with a composition determined by the organization.

/Question/ There was wide international solidarity on the part of the various delegations in Larnaca with the PLO delegation and its right to participate. Through your contacts with Banghazi, did you perceive a similar consensus on the part of the delegations that had arrived there?

/Answer/ Of course. The resolution adopted by the permanent secretariat in Larnaca was exactly as follows: Delegations participating in the meeting of the presidential body will not go without the Palestinian delegation.

This in itself is a clear, unalterable position. Hence, the unanimous decision to postpone the meeting.

/Question/ Do you believe that the delegations' consensus about the necessity to include the Palestinian delegation spared AAPSO a kind of schism which would have been inevitable had the delegations split between supporters and opponents?

/Answer/ We believe that the failure of the presidential body to meet is a negative aspect in itself, not a positive one.

The more negative aspect, however, would be the PLO's absence from the meeting which, undoubtedly, we had hoped would be held. But the postponement was based on refusal to participate without the attendance of the Palestinian delegation. This clear resolution of principle protects AAPSO's constitution and unity and wards off possible future perils which it may encounter as a result of some countries' exercising the right of "veto" against other countries or movements. It also arms AAPSO with experience and ammunition to prepare well for future meetings whereby it will possess the supreme authority and legitimacy in determining who should participate in its meetings at any location where they may be held.

/Question/ Do you think that the Iraq-Iran war, the recent developments in the Western Desert dispute, and other issues as well, would have raised other differences with the Libyan side had the predicament of Palestinian participation been overcome?

/Answer/ Not all issues are supposed to be a subject of total agreement. Rather, they should be the subject of free, open and deep discussion based on a desire to achieve solidarity and cooperation for the sake of counteracting imperialism and Zionism.

The final say in the various issues I have indicated will be to the majority of the participants, for total unanimity is not a condition. The main condition is to present these issues, discuss them freely and democratically and come out with a majority decision.

/Question/ Through the negotiations you held with the Libyan authorities, either directly, such as the telephone contact with 'Abd-al-'Ati al-'Ubaydi, foreign relations secretary, or indirectly through the Libyan ambassador in

Nicosia or Mr 'Abd-al-Wahhab al-Zantani, chairman of the Libyan solidarity committee, did you perceive the basis on which the Libyans founded their position? And, what prompted them to adopt such a stance, although they knew it was legally wrong and unenforceable as well?

/Answer/ You should ask this of the Libyan delegation. This is their viewpoint and their conviction. However, the ramifications of this position are a matter that concerns us. Every country has the right to adopt the resolution that is in line with its policy. The Libyan stance is in keeping with their position and their viewpoint. However, it is Libya's viewpoint alone and must not be imposed on the other delegations.

/Question/ But what arguments do they adhere to?

/Answer/ They believe that their principled position dictates the nonparticipation of the PLO delegation and barring it from Libyan territory.

/Question/ How, then, did an official delegation from the Palestinian Teachers General Federation, representing the PLO, participate in the Arab Teachers Federation Conference held from 11 to 20 March?

/Answer/ In Libya!?

/Question/ Yes, in Libya. Two out of the five names who were refused entry in the recent Libyan cable were among the participants in this conference and left Libya on 20 March, 4 days ago.

/Answer/ This should be asked of the Libyans as well. This change happened in their minds and not in our position. They are the ones who changed their position and are the ones who know if they have new reasons for their action. I cannot answer for them.

/Question/ Then do you think there is a relationship between this matter and the coincidental announcement of the so-called "Palestinian National Salvation Front" in Damascus?

/Answer/ We support the legitimacy of the PLO and its existence as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in accordance with the PNC and the Arab summit conference resolutions and the will of the Palestinian people.

/Question/ What issues was the Egyptian delegation going to raise had the conference been held, in view of Egypt being a founding member and the headquarters of AAPSO?

/Answer/ The issues we were going to raise are many, including support for the Palestinian revolution, support for the struggle in South Africa, the drought, the Iraq-Iran war problems and peace in the Gulf. The Egyptian delegation has specific and declared positions on these issues.

I would like to call your attention to the fact that the Egyptian delegation does not adopt the policy of axes nor does it support the policy of division or any disbanding of revolutionary forces. Rather, it pushes for the unification of these forces and the accord of the striving factions. The Egyptian solidarity committee shall play an effective role in this domain because we regard the present situation distressing and frustrating to the determination of the revolutionary forces worldwide.

/Question/ The Israeli aggression against the Arab countries in 1967 caused the postponement of AAPSO's fifth conference until 1982, when it was held in Cairo. Today there are some negative stances within the organization itself by some of its members and its influential forces. Do you think there is some kind of danger looming over it?

/Answer/ There is no danger at all. What happened will urge us to re-examine the political role this organization can play in the unification and rapprochement of the revolutionary forces.

/Question/ Have any of the organization's meetings gone through such a dilemma or been canceled or postponed for similar reasons?

/Answer/ No.

/Question/ What about the AAPSO presidency?

/Answer/ This is a matter tied to the organization's constitution, to which we are committed, particularly following the resignation of the former president, Mr 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Shirqawi.

/Question/ Is that all?

/Answer/ Our answer is clear. This is a matter that falls under the organization's constitution and the nomination process stems from the will of the Egyptian committee, which is the headquarters' country. The matter is presented to AAPSO in its constitutional body.

/Question/ Finally, would you like to draw my attention to anything else?

/Answer/ My greetings to the Palestinian fighters.

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CSO: 4504/324

EGYPT

MAGAZINE DESCRIBES RETURN OF SHAYKH AL-MAHALLAWI TO MOSQUE

Kuwait AL-MUJTAMA' in Arabic 23 Apr 85 pp 30-31

/Article: "With the Return of Shaykh al-Mahallawi, Egypt's Muslim People Stand With Their Preachers In Their Ordeal"/

/Text/ Shaykh Ahmad al-Mahallawi is an imam and the preacher of al-Qa'id Ibrahim Mosque in Alexandria. He was jailed by al-Sadat when the latter adopted his arbitrary decisions in 1981 and talked about him in his famous speech, saying that he--an eminent fighting preacher--was thrown in jail like a dog.

This preacher was jailed, tortured and interrogated at the highest levels in Egypt, but the prosecution and courts could not convict him of anything.

Today, the Muslim masses in the town of this preacher assert their condemnation of al-Sadat's decision and his prejudice against the nation's ulema and preachers through their kindly stand on the occasion of preacher al-Mahallawi's return to his mosque. Thousands of people took to the streets to take a look at the preacher who has returned to his pulpit, thus underscoring the fact that the rule of despots does not last.

On Friday, 7 April 1985, Alexandria witnessed a huge Islamic celebration on the occasion of the return of the great Islamic preacher, Shaykh Ahmad al-Mahallawi. The preacher was followed in prayer by thousands of Muslims who came to congratulate themselves on this occasion, regarded by Islamic circles in Alexandria as a holiday for the friends of Shaykh al-Mahallawi, who was removed following the September 1981 events subsequent upon his arrest shortly before Anwar al-Sadat's assassination.

About 30,000 persons from Alexandria and its environs followed the imam in prayer. They came from all over Alexandria and its environs to take their places at dawn last Friday. By 10 am the yard of al-Qa'id Ibrahim Mosque and the surrounding reception hall and front and back courtyards were filled with people and the street leading to Champollion Square and Champollion Street,

which were filled with worshippers, were closed. This is in addition to the tremendous number of cars that surrounded and blocked the roads leading to the mosque from all sides.

After the Friday prayer and sermon, the editor tried to meet with Shaykh al-Mahallawi, but all attempts failed due to the crowds of worshippers inside the mosque celebrating the imam's return. The imam could not leave the mosque amidst these huge crowds who lined up to greet him and bless his return. Some worshippers, however, formed a cordon around the imam to enable him to return to his home.

The editor had the following interview with Shaykh al-Mahallawi, who has returned to his home:

/Question/ Shaykh Ahmad al-Mahallawi, once again may God bless your return to your mosque.

/Answer/ Thank God, who is totally responsible for my return.

/Question/ How did your excellency's return to al-Qa'id Ibrahim Mosque come about?

/Answer/ The director of the Call at the Alexandria Awqaf office called me on the phone on Thursday, 28 March 1985, to inform me that the awqaf minister was here yesterday and did not see me. I told him that had I known of his presence, I would have come to welcome him and listen to him. The director told me that the minister was going to be here on Friday, 29 March, and said it would be nice if I contacted him, and I agreed.

On Friday, I met with the minister at the awqaf rest house. I greeted him and we engaged in cursory talk. The director of the Call then told the minister that Shaykh al-Mahallawi was a man who had done much for the Call, speaking of me in laudatory terms. The minister right away indicated that he had no objection to my return on the same day.

The minister said that there was no objection to Shaykh Ahmad al-Mahallawi's return to the mosque, saying in the course of his talk: "As long as the call is in 'wisdom and beautiful teaching,' and by that I do not mean not to criticize what ought to be criticized, I have no objection."

Right away I told his excellency: Allow me to say that had I not been interrogated in 1981 by all the judicial agencies in Egypt, it would be proper to say that I committed some excesses. But the fact is that I was interrogated at the highest judicial levels by the attorney general in Alexandria, then the socialist prosecutor, then the State Security /GDSSI/ prosecution, all of whom did not convict me of anything. I am not known as "that Shaykh al-Mahallawi." I informed his excellency that I would go to the mosque the following week because I was committed to another mosque and did not wish to leave the congregation without notice and without thanks and apologies.

I would like to add, a propos of what God Almighty said: "When a (courteous) greeting is offered, meet it with a greeting still more courteous, or (at least) of equal courtesy."

If the awqaf ministry of the government has allowed my return and feels that I am obliged to it, I, thanks be to God, had priority because I had a ruling by the Council of State in 1982 before my release from prison. And despite the people's insistence that the ruling be enforced, I preferred to leave it up to the government and to the awqaf ministry to adopt it so that the decision for my return would come from it without my asking the minister to petition the prosecution, which is a standard judicial procedure.

I believe that my return may have alleviated some severe pains caused by past decisions to keep away, unjustly and without cause, from 1981 to 1985, a preacher and a call that has become familiar to the people who feel comfortable with it.

Then I told the awqaf minister that Shaykh 'Abd-al-Hamid Kishk should return because his return would reassure the people and serve the cause of the call. He is a preacher who is well-liked by the people who like to listen to him.

His excellency said: "I have no objection to the return of Shaykh 'Abd-al-Hamid Kishk and all the preachers and imams who had been removed from their mosques. I have no objection to their return right now, but they have to petition the ministry or at least me."

The question that presents itself in the face of such a mass turnout to congratulate al-Mahallawi on his return to his pulpit is: "What is the significance of such a turnout at the mosque of a man who was wronged by the assassinated despot?"

The first significance is that Egypt's Muslim people have demonstrated their confidence in their preachers who were opposed by the despot. The arrival of thousands to preacher al-Mahallawi's mosque means that al-Mahallawi, the symbol of the call, represents an indispensable need of the Egyptian people. This preacher and others like him should not be removed from their pulpits.

The other indication is that the people's response is an indictment of the decision to remove loyal preachers from their pulpits to throw them in jail and detention camps.

Moreover, the Egyptian Muslim people will keep on supporting their preachers in their ordeals and will not be impeded by all the decisions of despots. Do the despots understand that?

He concluded his interview by asking God to crown the efforts of the imams and the preachers with success in their endeavors to exalt the word of God.

His excellency promised other interviews in the near future to discuss the most important religious, social and political issues at all levels and to comment on the most important political events in the world theater and on the condition of Muslims and Arabs worldwide.

EGYPT

ALEXANDRIA GETS NEW TELEVISION STATION

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 10 May 85 p 8

[Article by 'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim: "New communications project aimed at the regeneration of the Egyptian people; New Broadcast Station in Alexandria and Television Center in 6 October City"]

[Text] Mr Safwatal-Sharif, information minister, stated that the ministry has become more concerned with the development and support of regional broadcasts at the governorate level. This is in implementation of the new communications policy which Egypt is formulating to support regional broadcasting and to regenerate the Egyptian people in accordance with religious principles.

The minister said that a new broadcast station is currently being built in Alexandria to strengthen the city's transmitting power according to modern scientific and technological developments. Its strength will be 25,000 kilowatts. A new 60-meter-high transmitter, studios, and units to transmit programs are included at a cost of a million pounds.

Mr al-Sharif stated that work is now underway to renovate and relocate Studio 46, the broadcast facility, and the television editing room and to establish a new television center in 6 October City using the latest technological systems.

CSO: 4504/358

LIBYA

JANA VERSION OF LIBYA-BURUNDI COMMUNIQUE

LD171120 Tripoli JANA in English 0855 GMT 17 May 85

[Text] Tripoli, Shaban 27, 17 May, [JAMAHIRIYAH NEWS AGENCY]--A joint Libyan Arab-Burundi statement was issued yesterday in Tripoli and Bujumbura on the visit to the Republic of Burundi by the leader of the revolution for opening the Islamic cultural center.

In the statement the Libyan Arab and Burundi sides have expressed deep concern about the forms of intervention by imperialist, neo-colonialist and racist forces in the African countries and the increase of their plots and aggression against the African peoples.

In this respect the two sides strongly condemned the racist regime in South Africa which aims through aggression, false reforms and destructive manoeuvres to perpetuate the inhumane apartheid system and to harm the confrontation countries' stability and sovereignty.

They reaffirmed the necessity of the implementation of the United Nations' and the Organization of African Unity's resolutions on imposing compulsory total sanctions on the racist regime of Pretoria. They also reaffirmed the support to these sisterly countries and backing to the struggle of the people of South Africa in their struggle against such systems.

They confirmed and reaffirmed their approval and support to the struggle of the Palestinian Arab people and its right to use all the means to liberate, return to and establish the Palestinian independent state on its land. Then once more declared that peace cannot be achieved in the region without the full Zionist withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories.

The two sides strongly denounced the Zionist entity's production of nuclear weapons in collaboration with the racist regime of South Africa. They considered this action as an escalation of Zionist aggression in the Arab homeland and Africa. The Burundi side expressed its appreciation of the steps and effort exerted by the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for the accomplishment of the African Continent Unity, Arab unity and confirming world security and peace.

The Republic of Burundi condemns the repeated imperialist military manoeuvres held in the Mediterranean Sea region. It also condemns the military moves,

the economic embargo and the imperialist campaign launched against the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. It expresses its support for the Libyan Arab people in its defense of its sovereignty and its struggle against all threats and provocations in its territorial waters, including the Gulf of Sidra.

The viewpoints of both sides were identical on the right of states to receive just compensation for the damages inflicted on them as a result of occupation and colonialism, and compensation on the wars remnants which still form an obstacle to the implementation of national development plans.

Hereafter is the full text of the communique:

"A Communique"

In reply to the invitation of his Excellency Colonel Jean Baptiste Bagaza, leader of the Union for National Progress and the president of the Republic of Burundi, brother Colonel al-Qadhdhafi leader of the great al-Fatih September revolution made an official visit to the Republic of Burundi between the 24th to 26th of Shaban Betw 1394 corresponding with 14th-16th of May 1985.

Brother Colonel Mu'ammr al-Qadhdhafi and the accompanying delegation were publicly and officially received by a warm welcome whenever they stopped as an expression of the strong friendly links, and the long existing and deep ties between Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Republic of Burundi as well as the mutual feelings of appreciation and brotherhood between the peoples of the two countries.

During the visit brother Colonel Mu'ammr al-Qadhdhaf', leader of great al-Fatih of September revolution, visited some of the economic and social development schemes and expressed his great admiration for the progress achieved by the people of Burundi under the wise leadership of President Jean Baptiste Bagaza, president of the Republic of Burundi.

In an atmosphere of mutual amity, understanding and confidence the existing friendly relations between the two countries were reviewed. Discussions were held between brother Colonel Mu'ammr al-Qadhdhafi, leader of the great al-Fatih of September revolution and Colonel Jean Baptiste Bagaza, which dealt with all the issues of joint interests.

Viewing the political situation in the African continent, the two sides expressed their deep concern about the imperialist, neo-colonialism and racism of all forms, intervention in the African countries as well as their increasing conspiracies and aggressive acts against the African peoples.

The two sides condemned these interventions which aim at returning the military control and political domination over the African people potentials [as received] as well as threatening their security, peace and the unity of its lands. In this respect the two sides called for establishing a front for the progressive states to confront these threats.

The two sides reaffirmed their belief in and adherence to the basic principles laid down in the Organization of African unity's charter, the UN Charter and

their backing of the Non-Alignment Movement. They also reaffirmed particularly the principles of the people's right to self determination, equality between states and their sovereignties, non-interference in other states' internal affairs, the peaceful settlements of conflicts, struggle against racism and apartheid.

In this context, both sides strongly condemned the fascist regime of South Africa which, by its policies of repression, and the deceitful reforms aims at continuing the inhumane apartheid regime by following a policy of destructive manoeuvres, aims at destabilizing the front line states and their (?sovereignty). They stressed the need to carry out the resolutions of the UN, and OAU with regard to implementing comprehensive and abiding sanctions on the racist regime of Pretoria.

They renewed their solid support for these brotherly countries and to the South African peoples struggle against that hateful regime.

They strongly expressed support for struggle of the people of Namibia for independence under the leadership of their sole and legitimate representative the South-West Africa People's Organization SWAPO. They condemned all forms of manoeuvres that aim to delay Namibia's independence such as connecting it with the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. They also denounced the latest attempt by the racist regime in South Africa to form an internal administration in the region of Namibia and the establishment of an agent regime to loyal to her.

CSO: 4500/120

LIBYA

BRIEFS

SECRET VISIT TO N. AFRICA--Tripoli, 30 May (JANA)--AL-FAJR AL-JADID which is published here today, has quoted reliable sources as saying that the U.S. intelligence chief, together with a large delegation, paid a secret visit to two Arab states in North Africa. In one of the two states the delegation was joined by a group of officers from that state and a senior security official and together they inspected the joint borders with another Arab state. These sources have stressed that all the details of the visit and that talks held are known to the state whose borders were inspected. [Text] [Tripoli JANA in Arabic 1400 GMT 30 May 85 LD]

CSO: 4500/120

MOROCCO

BRIEFS

INDIAN COMMERCIAL OFFICIAL VISITS--Casablanca, 18 May (MAP)--M. A. Sangma, Indian minister of state to commerce, left here Friday after a few days official visit to Morocco. During his stay, the Indian minister led the delegate of his country to the works of the Moroccan-Indian Joint Commission held Wednesday in Rabat and signed with the Moroccan minister of commerce and industry, M. Tahar Masmoudi, an accord on trade and industrial exchanges. The Indian minister also conferred with Moroccan premier and other members of the cabinet. [Excerpt] [Rabat MAP in English 1204 GMT 18 May 85 LD]

OIL IMPORT FINANCING--An agreement was signed today at the headquarters of the Islamic Bank for Development in Jeddah according to which the bank will finance an operation by which Morocco is to import Saudi crude oil worth \$25 million. [Excerpt] [Rabat Domestic Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 16 May 85 LD]

1984 FOREIGN TRADE FIGURES--Casablanca, 23 May (MAP)--The bulletin of the center for economic and social studies and directions, which is attached to the Moroccan General Economic Confederation, said that foreign trade statistics issued by [garbled word] bureau had shown that the volume of imports in 1984 totalled 12,159,569 tons, with an estimated value of 34,395,500,000 dirhams, a rise of 14 percent in volume and 34.4 percent in value compared with the previous year. The bulletin noted that the price per imported ton rose from 2,397 dirhams in 1983 to 2,826 dirhams in 1984. The bulletin reported that the volume of Moroccan exports totalled 19,744,093 tons with an estimated value of 19,109,500,500 dirhams. It said that exports in comparison with 1983 had risen by 6.5 percent in volume and 29.8 in value and that the value of an exported ton had risen from 796 dirhams to 968 dirhams. The bulletin explained that the trade deficit totalled 15,286,000,000 dirhams in 1984 and that the percentage of the imports covered by exports had reached 55.6 percent. [Text] [Rabat MAP in Arabic 1530 GMT 23 May 85 LD]

CSO: 4500/121

ISRAEL

BRIEFS

SENIOR IDF APPOINTMENT--Today Brigadier General Avihu Bin-Nun was appointed head of planning in the IDF General Staff, Vice Major General Menahem 'Eynan, and was promoted to the rank of major general. This has been announced by the IDF spokesman. Maj Gen 'Eynan is going to the United States for further studies, after which a senior IDF post will await him. [Text] [Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1600 GMT 6 Jun 85 TA]

NEW RELIGIOUS PAPER--A new religious paper YATED NE'EMAN (FAITHFUL FOUNDATION), the acronym for Torah interpretation, will be published within the next few days. The initiative for the paper's publication comes from Rabbi Shakh, who has been unhappy with what has recently been happening in the HAMODI'A editorial board, which is no longer subservient to his rule and is too inclined toward the Gur Hassidic group. [Excerpt] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 4 Jun 85 p 3 TA]

CRM PUBLISHES NEW MONTHLY--A new monthly journal will be published in Israel by the Citizens Rights Movement (CRM). The journal will be named POLITICS and its editors will be 'Idit (Sartari) and Yosi Sarid. The editors say the journal will be open to anyone with talent, regardless of their political affiliation, but its political orientation will be dovish and radical. The first issue will be mainly devoted to the 3d anniversary of the war in Lebanon. [Text] [Jerusalem Television Service in Hebrew 1800 GMT 3 Jun 85 TA]

DECREASE IN UNEMPLOYMENT REGISTERED--A decrease of 9 percent in unemployment was registered at the end of the first quarter of 1985, in comparison to the last quarter of 1984. At the end of March, there were 85,000 unemployed in Israel. From data released today by the Central Bureau of Statistics, it transpires that the percentage of unemployed among Israel's labor force has decreased from 6.4 percent to 5.8 percent. [Text] [Jerusalem Television Service in Hebrew 1800 GMT 3 Jun 85 TA]

SOVIET JEWS EMIGRATION--Only 51 Jews left the USSR last month and only 7 of them arrived in Israel. Our correspondent Avraham Ben-Melekh notes that in April, 167 Jews left the Soviet Union and the Soviet authorities presented this as a change in their policy. [Text]
[Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 2 Jun 85 TA]

JERUSALEM AREA PLAGUE--A plague called Malta Fever is spreading through a number of Jerusalem area villages. More than 30 people have already contracted the disease which attacks the intestines and is caused by unpasteurized milk products. Jerusalem's chief veterinarian believes the plague has already spread to other villages as well. [Summary]
[Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 2 Jun 85 TA]

CSO: 4400/158

KUWAIT

KUWAITI PAPER ON WORLD BROADCASTING, MONITORING

GF191430 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 16 May 85 Weekend Edition p 29

[From the "Thursday Pages": "A World War on the Air Waves"]

[Text] A fierce war of words is taking place on the world's air waves on which scores of countries transmit a total of 25,000 hours a week of news, music, and propaganda in 140 languages at a cost of billions of dollars. Official stations of 128 countries and 46 clandestine stations are taking part in this war.

The CIA records every word broadcast by these stations.

Albania's Radio Tirana broadcasts a song which it introduces as "a Canadian folk song" and is called "Arise O Proletarian" and is beamed to North America.

The Chinese, who like to disturb those who are living on Taiwan and in other places too, do not leave a stone without casting it from their radio. They even broadcast programs in Esperanto, an artificial language which very few people understand.

Moscow Radio, despite the excellent American accent of some of its broadcasters, is still heavy going although some listeners say that the Russians are making their maximum efforts to improve its programs. The announcer on the program "Moscow Mailbag" a program that responds to listeners' letters responds critically to anyone who criticizes the Soviet Union. For instance, when a listener recently wrote asking why does one have to wait such a long time at Soviet airports, the program presenter replied that once he had to wait for 6 hours at Cleveland's airport to take a plane to La Guardia.

From such programs the foreign listener learns that whistling in private places such as homes is a big insult to the host in the Soviet Union, and that putting one's feet on a coffee table in airport waiting rooms is an insult to the host country. Therefore, one constantly finds guards asking travelers to lift their feet off the tables.

The Americans in turn are preoccupied with broadcasting articles and statements by Russian dissidents in 15 of the Soviet Union's local languages. The BBC always precedes its newscasts with the chimes of Big Ben, while Prague radio broadcasts a song described as "Prague's Response to Barbara Streisand."

In El Salvador, there are two clandestine stations run by the rebels. They broadcast the news before the government radio and each of the two stations broadcasts rebel news 4 hours a day.

As we have said, there are 128 countries that spend billions of dollar on broadcasting some 25,000 hours a week of words and music on short-wave in 140 different languages and the countries admit it. As for the 46 clandestine stations, no one admits that they exist.

Every word broadcast by these official and clandestine stations is recorded by the CIA and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) which divide the information between them. Certainly, the Soviet Union records them as well. There are other countries that concentrate on monitoring and recording the broadcasts of specific geographical areas, such as the constantly troubled Middle East.

It is truly an astonishing war of words. It is said that the American people are unaware of it. The number of persons in the United States who listen to shortwave broadcasts is very little. Most of them are radio amateurs, students, emigres, and professors. However, the BBC says that there are more than 2 million people who listen to its programs in America.

In the countries where there is press censorship, listening to foreign radios is the principal way of knowing what is happening abroad, or inside the country itself as was the case in Poland during Solidarity's battles with the authorities.

Music, news, editorials, religious programs, talks, panel discussions, and literary work that is banned in the country of its author, these are part of the battle by which the countries participating in the war of words seek to present and explain their views to the world.

Some odd things occur. Albania, a small communist country that appears to be constantly battling with all other countries of the world is the country that is most preoccupied with external broadcasting. Boyle [not further identified] says that no one takes the Albanians seriously. It appears that only the Albanians take themselves seriously. Albania ranks ninth among the countries of the world in its broadcast hours. It spends vast sums to send its message abroad. The crowding of the airwaves sometimes becomes intense as a result of the programs broadcast from Albania [as published], so much so that two international conferences have been held in the past 2 years to

draw up a plan that is fair to everyone. However, all such efforts proved futile. A radio engineer says that the entire world broadcasting system may collapse as a result.

Richard Measham, head of the Reception Department at the BBC [title as published], says that broadcasting on shortwave these days is like going to a crowded party where only the voice of the one who shouts loudest is heard.

The Soviet Union is the biggest broadcasting country. It broadcasts in 48 languages, 2.174 hours a week at an annual cost of \$75 million. This last figure, taken from a 1983 CIA report, includes the cost of propaganda including propaganda broadcast by clandestine stations within the Soviet Union.

The United States comes in second place: It broadcasts 5,017 hours a week [figure as published] at an annual cost of \$250 million. The official government radio is the Voice of America which is run by the U.S. Information Service. VOA broadcasts 990 hours a week in 42 languages. It was founded on 24 February 1942, some 79 days after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor. In its first broadcast it pledged to give both good and bad news.

The PRC ranks as the third broadcasting country, after the Soviet Union and the United States. It broadcasts in 43 languages 1,395 hours a week including 49 hours a week in English beamed to North America.

Taiwan is the fourth broadcasting country, followed by Egypt, West Germany, Britain, North Korea, Albania, Voice of the Andes, a religious station that broadcasts from the Ecuador, South Korea, India, Israel, Australia, and the FEBC [Far East Broadcasting Company] which broadcasts religious programs from the Philippines, Nigeria, and Austria.

The Soviet Union has expanded and recently introduced an integrated program in French primarily beamed to the Francophone countries of West Africa.

The U.S. Congress has also appropriated large funds for improving coverage and broadcasting penetration. VOA has been awarded \$85 million to build new installations, while Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty each have received \$23 million to buy modern equipment.

In view of the increase in demand for radio channels, two World Administrative Conferences were held in 1979 and 1984 and a third is scheduled for 1987. These conferences are sponsored by the UN's International Telecommunication Union and aim to distribute and allocate radio channels fairly among applicants.

The 1984 conference has authorized access to new channels that were supposed to be used before the 1989-1994 period. [sentence as published] The Soviet Union, Israel, Pakistan, and Iran are already vying for these channels.

Western observers believe that the BBC's External Service offers the best prepared programs in the world. (Jean Susin) [not further identified] says that this reputation goes back to World War II: When other radios used to report that a small number of attacking British aircraft have been shot down, the BBC used to broadcast the real figure immediately, even when such a figure for downed British aircraft was higher than that reported by German radios.

CSO: 4400/160

OMAN

BRIEFS

RURAL TELEPHONE AGREEMENT SIGNED--Ahmad Ibn Suwaydan al-Bulushi, minister of post, telegraph, and telephone yesterday signed a 17 million Omani riyals agreement for improving the rural telephone service system with Swedish company (Arexon). According to the agreement the company will build 6 major distributing boards in Sur, Abri, Nazwi 1, Nazwi 2, Sahr, including (al-Barimi), and another 36 locations which have not yet been served. The total number of the telephone lines is 27,000. [Excerpt] [Muscat 'UMAN in Arabic 28 May 85 p 1 GF]

CSO: 4400/161

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

BUDAPEST RADIO INTERVIEWS DFLP'S HAWATIMAH

LD041908 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1630 GMT 4 Jun 85

[Report on interview with Nayif Hawatimah, general secretary of Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine [DFLP], by Budapest Radio reporter Peter Zentai; time and place not given; recorded remarks by Hawatimah in Arabic fading into Hungarian translation contained in quotation marks]

[Text] I wonder how a Palestinian leader explains the recent Beirut developments, the fact that people who up until now have been allies are fighting against one another. This is the question I put to the general secretary of the organization that calls itself the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. This was his reply:

"The Amal organization, which consists mainly of Shi'ites, started a comprehensive attack against the Lebanese Palestinian camps with the objective of eliminating them once and for all. You also are aware that the Shi'ites live mainly in the southern part of Lebanon, where they want to assure their rule. At the same time they fear the Israelis. In essence, we Palestinians are in the way of both the Shi'ites and the Israelis. What is happening is but the continuation of the Egyptian-Israeli separate deal. Israel and the Amal movement have agreed to our loss. The world's progressive forces must help to prevent the creation of a new, separate peace.

What is happening has also come in handy for 'Arafat and his men, since now they see their direction as justified namely, that there has to be a deal with the main enemy, Israel."

This is what Hawatimah said, at which point I mentioned that as far as I knew it was 'Arafat's men who were defending the Palestinian camps around Beirut. To this, however, Hawatimah replied as follows:

"The truth is that those who are struggling in Beirut are indeed first and foremost the members of the Fatah organization, but they support the leaders who take a stand against 'Arafat. 'Arafat, in a demagogic way, is taking unfair advantage of the sentiments of the Palestinian masses and is acting as if he were still leading the armed struggle."

I also asked Hawatimah how he evaluates Syria's role in the events and the reports that the Lebanese leaders are urging military intervention in Syria. This was his reply:

"The Amal and Syria are allies. The Damascus news media are only passing on the opinion of Amal. It is tragic that this is so, since an internecine struggle is going on. It is obvious that the Amal and Syria alike are interested in the Israeli finally withdrawing from Lebanon. At the same time they know that the Palestinian fighters are consistently pursuing the struggle against Israel. We consider it to be Lebanon's internal affair whether the local leaders ask Syria for help or not. We cannot interfere in this. The only thing that is important for us is that our rights should be respected. It is our duty to defend the over 400,000 Palestinians who are forced to live as refugees under inhuman conditions in Lebanon."

CSO: 4400/160

QATAR

BRIEFS

IMPORTS IN 1984--Doha, 24 May (GNA)--According to the quarterly statistical bulletin of the Qatari Monetary Agency, Qatar's imports in the third quarter of 1984 totaled 1.0095 billion Qatari riyals, 205.8 million Qatari riyals less than imports for the period in 1983. Imports included machinery, transport equipment, foodstuff, animal livestock, miscellaneous manufactured goods, chemical products, raw material, drinks, tobacco, animal and vegetable oils and fats, and lubricants. Imports from Japan during the third quarter of 1984 totaled 247.6 million riyals, the highest from any country in that period. Imports from Britain totaled 128.7 million riyals, from the United States 98.4 million riyals, from West Germany 52.1 million riyals, from Italy 47.9 million riyals, from Syria 29.7 million riyals, from the UAE 23 million riyals, and imports from Jordan totalled 11.8 million riyals in the third quarter of 1984. [Summary] [Doha GNA in Arabic 0855 GMT 24 May 85 GF]

CSO: 4400/160

SAUDI ARABIA

LONDON SAUDI MAGAZINE DISCUSSES AL-FAYSAL TEHRAN VISIT

PM300801 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 29 May 85 pp 8, 9

[Diplomatic editor article: "Amir Sa'ud al-Faysal's Visit to Tehran: Putting Out Fire in the Saudi Way, More Encompassing Than Mediation in Gulf War"]

[Excerpts] In Saudi diplomacy there is a clear principle which is known to all those who deal with it. The principle is to avoid contradiction between what is announced and what is not announced.

When the Saudi foreign minister said in Tehran that his talks with Iranian officials took place in a "frank" atmosphere he really meant what he said.

Although Amir Sa'ud al-Faysal usually says little in his statements, yet he said a lot and listened a lot during a total of 14 hours of meetings with Iranian officials.

In the talks with Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati, Head of State 'Ali Khamane'i, and Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani four basic principles governed the talks which the Saudi foreign minister was anxious to stress both in words and in behavior.

These principles are:

First, that the Saudi Arabian Kingdom, since the era of its founder the late King 'Abd al-'Aziz and up to the era of King Fahd ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, has adhered to its own constants. These are based on bringing the Muslims together and urging them to adhere to solidarity and shun division and rifts.

The Saudi foreign minister was anxious to make it clear to the Iranian side that these principles are not mere political slogans or polite words but the essence of Saudi policy and action.

Second, that the Saudi Arabian Kingdom always believes in reasonable action, pursuing the principle of frank dialogue with its brothers, neighbors, and the superpowers, and in doing what it says openly and in closed talks.

Third, that the bilateral relations between the Saudi Arabian Kingdom and the Islamic Republic of Iran cannot advance or develop further without a frank and bold dialogue over all the issues of interest to both countries. Such dialogue is the responsibility of both sides and future steps in this regard should be positive and more dynamic than they have been since 1980.

Fourth, that the Saudi foreign minister's visit in response to his Iranian opposite number, although greatly concerned with what is happening on the Iraq-Iran battlefield, is more than just an immediate mediation effort between Baghdad and Tehran.

Amir Sa'ud al-Faysal's visit to Tehran aimed at discussing the past, present, and future relations between the two countries as a whole including, of course, the Iraq-Iran war. [passage omitted]

The visit, as a Gulf source described it, "was the first real approach to put matters between Iran on one hand and Saudi Arabia and the GCC states on the other in their right perspective."

The source added: "The visit was not a continuation of the efforts of the Islamic mediation committee or the international mediation to put an end to the destructive war."

The question then is: Can two different schools of thought such as those of Saudi diplomacy and Iranian diplomacy lay down a formula for dialogue and will this dialogue result in agreement on clear principles?

The answer to this comes from the same Gulf source: "Any dialogue in the world depends on four factors: the parties to the dialogue, the subject of the dialogue, the atmosphere of the dialogue, and the nature of the dialogue."

If we were to apply this to what went on between the Saudi and Iranian sides in Tehran we would be able to draw a somewhat optimistic picture.

The dialogue between Riyadh and Tehran is a common desire; the subject of the dialogue is how each party views its future strategy; the atmosphere of the dialogue is the desire to rescue the area from the disasters and foreign interference from which it is suffering; and the nature of the dialogue is frankness and direct approach without beating around the bush. All these factors place the relations between the two countries on the threshold of real understanding.

Despite the fact that certain Western media sources have cited specific figures which the two sides discussed concerning compensations for the destructive war, sources have affirmed to AL-MAJALLAH that the subject was not discussed at any of the meetings. According to a well-informed source, the Saudi side did not discuss or propose to discuss this matter and the Iranian side did not even ask to discuss it in any way.

Any attempt to portray any Saudi official carrying a bag full of money trying to use it to buy solutions to political crises is a deliberate distortion by the biased media and contrary to the truth and essence of the Saudi policy, its intrinsic capabilities, and historical credit.
[passage omitted]

What could the result of the visit in the near future be? Information available to AL-MAJALLAH indicates four results:

1. The opening of a strong and continuing contact channel between Riyadh and Tehran which henceforth could contribute to the achievement of positive results regarding many issues in the area.
2. An expected visit by Iranian Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati to the Saudi Arabian Kingdom in the near future and the launching of a new positive chapter in the relations between the two countries.
3. The Iranian side to begin redrawing its geopolitical views in the area on the basis of its new concept and the principles established by Amir S'aud al-Faysal's visit.
4. Saudi Arabia has clearly expounded the philosophy of the Saudi monarch which Amir Sa'ud conveyed to the Iranian side, namely that the problems and tensions in the area cannot be resolved overnight, but there is no alternative to frank dialogue between the two sides in order to stop the blood-letting from which the area is suffering.

If Amir Sa'ud al-Faysal's visit to Tehran was the first by a Saudi official since the declaration of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, the coming days will prove that the visit is the opening to important visits and dialogues.

CSO: 4400/159

SAUDI ARABIA

SAUDI PAPER ON NEED TO DEFEND INTERNAL ARAB FRONT

GF290720 Riyadh Domestic Service in Arabic 0600 GMT 29 May 85

[From the press review]

[Text] The newspaper AL-MADINAH commented on the work of the Arab Center for Security Studies and Training. The paper said: the concept of defending the internal Arab front signifies an guarantee for the safety of Arab society and the spread of security and stability among its members through protecting from crime and developing programs for social and economic development.

Since the Arabs are facing an enemy who tries to tear apart the Arab homeland and impose control over it bit by bit after it has taken over Palestine, the defense of the internal front has become an absolute necessity. A strong internal front is certainly the basic support for the front lines and the principal conflict points.

The paper added: the establishment of the Arab Center for Security Studies and Training comes in response to the requirements of protecting Arab society and its internal front.

From this springs the Kingdom's desire to enable the center to carry out its duty in the best way. Furthermore the Kingdom's sense of security drives it to help in providing the means of security and stability for others, particularly in the Arab and Islamic worlds.

CSO: 4400/159

SAUDI ARABIA

KING ISSUES DECREE ON TENDERS TO SAUDI CONTRACTORS

GF311424 Riyadh SPA in Arabic 1255 GMT 31 May 85

[Text] Al-Ta'if, 31 May (SPA)---Shaykh Muhammad Aba al-Khayl, minister of finance and national economy, has stated that based on his majesty the king's interest in supporting Saudi contractors, his majesty has issued a decree to all ministries, government departments, and public institutions in which he emphasizes the need to implement his majesty's previous decrees to restrict all contracts pertaining to roads, normal bridges, and small- and medium-sized buildings to Saudi contractors, while at the same time exerting the utmost efforts to give them the opportunity to implement government projects by breaking these projects down into segments in order to make it easier for them to qualify for these projects. The decree also emphasized the king's directions concerning the restricting of nonconstructional contracts: maintenance, operation, cleaning, transportation, and supplying raw materials to Saudi contractors.

The minister of finance and national economy added that his majesty's order includes the formation of a permanent committee from the Ministry of Finance and National Economy; the Ministry of Commerce; and the Department of Public Control which will specialize in following up the implementation of all these decrees and ascertaining that they are carried out as required.

The minister of finance and national economy said that this royal decree complements the previous directions which are aimed at supporting Saudi contractors, such as the decree requiring foreign contractors to give no less than 30 percent of the value of any contract which they undertake to implement with the government to Saudi contractors, and other decrees which aim at providing opportunities for Saudi contractors to participate in implementing government projects, and considering this a primary aim, particularly as the Saudi contracts sector includes a large number of contractors who have invested large sums of money in the capital of their companies. Furthermore, the success of this sector is in the final analysis considered a success for the national economy, by the experience which this sector will gain and by what it will add to the national capital.

CSO: 4400/159

SAUDI ARABIA

FIGURES SHOW GROWTH OF PRIVATE SECTOR ACTIVITY

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 11 May 85 pp 43-44

[Article: "The Saudi Private Sector--Figures and Indices"]

[Text] At the second conference of Saudi businessmen, held in late March 1985 in Riyadh, several important topics were discussed in connection with the Saudi private sector, its performance during the 1982-83 petroleum boom, and its situation during the post-boom period.

While many people feel that the Saudi private sector is very healthy, and that it may even have a larger financial surplus than the government, other observers say that its position in the Saudi market is nothing like it was before, and that there are challenges and concerns which may overwhelm it, even if it does have billions of dollars in surpluses. Money is not as essential as effective circumstances and new ideas for managing the companies and organizations and their expenditures, and for achieving a minimum of waste and loss.

How big is the private sector, and how has it developed? Saudi Planning Minister Shaykh Hisham al-Nazir answers these questions by making the following points.

1. The Saudi government has provided loans through the Private Sector Development Fund for the construction of 882 industrial projects with commitments amounting to more than 13 billion Saudi riyals, in addition to 61 cold-storage warehouses costing more than 245 million riyals. The fund has also provided 39 billion riyals in loans to electric companies, in addition to more than 293,000 loans totalling more than 74.5 billion riyals for private housing. The Real Estate Development Fund has provided more than 2,100 investment loans amounting to 4.5 billion riyals. If we add these loans to others offered to businessmen by the Agricultural Bank and other government organizations, we find that to date more than 189 billion riyals in loans have been made to citizens.

2. The private sector has complied with government policies and has benefited from government incentives. During the third development plan, private

sector investments amounted to 173 billion riyals, and its contribution to fixed capital rose from 23 percent in 1979 to more than 35 percent in 1984. During the first 4 years of the third development plan, the number of private sector organizations increased to 195,000, of which more than 5,600 companies had capitals in excess of 58 billion riyals.

True, most of these organizations are small, and more than 80 percent of them employ fewer than five workers, while approximately 2 percent employ more than 50 workers. However, the most outstanding feature of corporate growth during the past 10 years has been the increase in the number of joint-venture companies, from 13 percent of all companies in 1975 to about 25 percent in 1983. This reflects the tendency to utilize technology in production and to increase the size of the companies. The average volume of investment relative to the number of Saudi companies rose from 1.1 million riyals in 1975 to 9.2 million riyals in 1983, which confirms the private sector companies' rapid growth and expanded activity. Furthermore, the average volume of investment in joint-venture companies rose from 5.4 million riyals in 1975 to 13.9 million riyals in 1983. Joint-venture companies are the primary means of transferring and absorbing modern technology.

3. The value of overall local production in the private, non-petroleum sector rose from 74.6 billion riyals in 1980 to 127.4 billion riyals by the end of the third development plan in 1985. This means that an average yearly growth rate of 11.3 percent in current prices was achieved.

4. The private, non-petroleum sector's share of total employment increased moderately, from 85.3 percent in 1980 to 88 percent in 1985. This increase occurred at the expense of a relative drop in government sector employment, a new phenomenon which indicates the private sector's expanding production base.

5. Those active in the Saudi private sector forget the important role which the Saudis played before the government began following scientific planning methods in the development process. True, the private sector's activity is concentrated in commerce and importation, but it is not entirely restricted to those areas. It helped finance school construction and expenditures when the Kingdom's education boom began, and private sector individuals and companies built and operated the first electric grids in the Kingdom's main cities. Others established many industries and built numerous public works projects.

Shaykh al-Nazir stresses that contrary to what some foreign newspapers are reporting, there are many opportunities for Saudi businessmen to launch many projects, particularly in the fields of agriculture and industry. The fourth development plan includes the following categories.

1. At least 200 industries could be established to use the products of the basic industries in al-Jubayl and Yanbu'. Our friends in Japan, Europe and America are extremely interested in getting into these industries, and therefore our private sector is presumably interested in entering these fields as well, and is finding out about them through SABIC and PETROMIN, and is deciding who its partners will be and what role they will play.

2. The development plan includes 1.444 new projects worth about 80 billion riyals, besides those 1,782 projects worth 209.6 billion riyals carried over from the third development plan.

3. Small contracting and maintenance companies have been advised to merge into optimum-size companies, so as to benefit from the combined equipment and manpower, so that they can compete for maintenance projects put up for bids by the government. However, at the same time I would like to stress the importance of clear-sighted, informed, direct management of such organizations.

4. A second strategic principle is to give the private sector the opportunity to operate, manage, maintain and overhaul some of the utilities which the state is now operating, provided that this results in the actual advantage of reduced costs, improved performance, and employment of Saudi citizens. It is now up to the private sector to study these utilities and to submit bids to the authorities managing them, so that the purpose of the strategy can be achieved.

From what Shaykh al-Nazir says, it does not appear that Saudi Arabia is experiencing any development crisis or constriction of economic activity, as some people imagine. Rather, it is entering a new phase quite different from previous ones--the stage of imagination, innovation, effort and efficiency.

8559

CSO: 4404/350

SAUDI ARABIA

RED SEA SEMINAR OPENS WITH HISTORICAL REVIEW

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic 18-24 May 85 pp 12-13

[Article by Husayn Karim: "A Peaceful Event In a Hot Sea"]

[Text] It may seem out of place to speak of the Red Sea at this particular time, since we won't be talking about a heated incident crying out for a solution for cooling it down. The Arab world is full of incidents which have been at the boiling point for years, and thus it has become difficult to turn one's attention to other matters which have less bearing on the security and stability of the area.

One event which might come under the heading of "peaceful events" right now was the Red Sea seminar held by the Saudi Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic Studies Institute during the first week of May. However, according to some sources, this seminar is most certainly inseparable from the "strategic circle" which will determine the nature of the international struggle over the Gulf area in the foreseeable future.

Herein lies the significance of the 4-day seminar, during which top scientists and specialists from Arab countries and from Saudi Arabia came together to discuss a vital topic in all its political, strategic, economic and legal aspects.

From the standpoint of the surrounding countries, the question of the Red Sea and the maritime corridors controlled by Bab al-Mandab and the Straits of Tiran is an issue which has imposed itself on the superpowers' calculations. Recalling the mining of Red Sea waters which occurred less than a year ago, and how the Red Sea countries got together at a meeting in Jiddah, and how the situation was defused because of the "Egyptian circumstance," reveals just how much this sea figures in regional and international calculations. It might also be useful to recall that Israeli strategy is based on not tolerating freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, even if that should lead to Israel's going to war, as happened in 1967.

Therefore, this seminar provided an opportunity to objectively examine the question of Red Sea security. Also, according to informed sources, this seminar had legal, economic, and scientific dimensions inseparable from the present international situation.

With respect to history, the seminar devoted its first session to a review and discussion of the historical outlook towards the Red Sea, and how this has influenced the world's attitude towards this sea.

Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal explained this point in a speech which was delivered for him by Deputy Foreign Minister 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Thaniyan at the opening session. His speech emphasized the importance of the Red Sea, the history of which goes back to the dawn of history and alongside which the oldest, most deeply-rooted human civilizations arose.

He added, "As an essential result of its geographic location as a navigation lane connecting North, South, East and West, the eyes of the entire world have been focussed on it, and it has become a factor which has attracted foreign competition and intervention throughout the ages."

From the strategic angle, the Red Sea was discussed in several contexts. The significance of Red Sea maritime corridors, especially Bab-al-Mandab, was discussed, as well as the repercussions of both the Arab-Israeli struggle and the conflict in the African Horn on the situation in the Red Sea. It was for this reason that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia called an international conference of all the countries along the Red Sea--this conference being the one held in Jiddah in July 1972 in order to affirm these countries' rights to Red Sea resources. According to Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal's speech, these rights constituted part of the strategy for Red Sea entrances and maritime corridors, but took on other dimensions once petroleum was discovered in the Arab Gulf.

8559

CSO: 4404/350

SAUDI ARABIA

BRIEFS

SAUDI-BAHRAIN CAUSEWAY--Jeddah, 22 May (SPA)--Dr Sulayman al-Jurayban, general director of the Saudi Arabian-Bahraini causeway project, has told SPA that 80 percent of the basic construction phase work on the bridge is complete. He said that all the pillars, segments, and upper parts of the causeway are in place, and work now being done to complete the causeway border posts, paving, lighting, and connecting the causeway to the road systems in both Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. [Summary] [Riyadh SPA in Arabic 0800 GMT 22 May 85 GF]

ECONOMIC FUND AGREEMENT--The Arab fund for Economic and Social Development and Djibouti signed an agreement today. According to the agreement, the fund will grant a loan to Djibouti worth 1,000,900 Kuwaiti dinars as a contribution to financing the sea cable project linking Southeast Asia and Western Europe via the Middle East. The agreement was signed on behalf of the fund by Dr Muhammad Al-'Amadi, chairman of the board of directors and director general of the fund. It was signed on behalf of Djibouti by the Djibouti ambassador to the Kingdom. [Text] [Jeddah Domestic Service in Arabic 1400 GMT 22 May 85 GF]

AGRICULTURAL BANK REPORT--Riyadh, 2 Jun (SPA)--The agricultural bank extended 23,844 loans worth 3,495,763,199 riyals to farmers in various parts of the kingdom during the 1983-84 fiscal year. The bank also extended other aid worth 122,535,233 riyals. In its annual report for 1983-84, the bank stated that the total sum collected from borrowers during the same year was 858,682,367 riyals, an increase of 40 percent over last year's figure of 615,384,954 riyals. [Excerpt] [Riyadh SPA in Arabic 1045 GMT 2 Jun 85 GF]

CSO: 4400/159

SYRIA

DATA TRACES UPWARD PATH OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 10 Mar 85 p 4

/Article by Dr 'Abd-al-Malik al-Akhras: "Numbers Talk About the Economy of Modern Developed Syria Under the Ba'th Revolution"/

/Excerpts/ The 8 March revolution represented a decisive turning point in the modern history of Syria in particular and the Arab nation in general. This revolution throughout its constructive march has been able to effect the necessary changes in the prevailing economic and social structures for the sake of building a socialist progressive Arab society.

Hafiz al-Asad's Syria, 22 years after the 8 March revolution, has turned into a modern developed country of great economic, political and national significance, thanks to the gains and accomplishments that have lifted our developing country to the forefront of the more-developed countries among the group of countries which are on the path of development.

Perhaps it would be useful, while celebrating the 22nd anniversary of the 8 March revolution, to review quickly the national economic developments of the past few years through our numerical analysis of the most important elements that constitute the national calculations.

The national calculations in the Syrian Arab region indicate that the country has experienced considerable development in the main structure that constitutes the national economy through its implementation of the four 5-year economic and social plans.

According to Ownership

The 8 March revolution has accorded the public sector special attention in that it now draws most of the most important activities and functionaries. The development of the public sector, however, did not cause the state to do away with the role of the private sector. Rather, the government has been keen on allowing this sector to play a positive and prominent role, side by side with the public sector, in the social and economic development process.

Statistics point out that the production of the public sector in 1963 totaled 2.254 billion Syrian pounds, compared to 4.201 billion for the private sector.

In other words, public production represented 35 percent of overall production compared to 65 percent for the private sector.

In 1970, public sector production was 4.564 billion pounds, a 102 percent increase over 1963 production. Public sector contribution to overall production went up 44.4 percent. In 1980, public sector production was 44.437 million pounds, a 1,871 percent increase over 1963 and 874 percent over 1970. Its percentage of overall production rose to 54 percent, which underscores the great support the corrective movement afforded the public sector. Moreover, in 1984, the public sector's contribution to overall production was 72.283 billion pounds, a 3,107 percent increase and a 55 percent rate of contribution.

According to Economic Sectors

In 1963, the agricultural sector represented 22 percent of the GNP. This rate dropped to 16 percent in 1970, 1980 and 1981 and also in 1984.

This drop in the contribution of the agricultural sector is the result of affording the greatest attention to the other sectors such as industry, mining, building and construction and the service sector, as shown in Table VI.

However, the value of production in all the economic sectors rose considerably during the last 20 years:

--The production of the agricultural sector rose from 1.437 billion pounds in 1963 to 20.826 billion in 1984, a 1,349 percent increase.

--The production of the industrial sector rose from 1.991 billion pounds in 1963 to 38.630 billion in 1984, a 1,840 percent increase.

--The production of the building and construction sector rose from 310 million pounds in 1963 to 14.665 billion in 1984, a 4,631 percent increase.

--The wholesale and retail trade production rose from 1.126 billion pounds in 1963 to 22.895 billion in 1984, a 1,933 percent increase over 1963.

--The production of the transportation, communications and storage sector rose from 461 million pounds in 1963 to 10.2 billion in 1984, a 2,113 percent increase over 1963.

--The finance, insurance and real estate sector increased its production from 475 million pounds in 1963 to 4.72 billion in 1984, an 894 percent increase.

--The production of social and personal services rose from 77 million pounds in 1963 to 2.218 billion in 1984, a 2,718 percent increase.

--The government services sector grew from 567 million in 1963 to 17.2 billion in 1984, a 2,934 percent increase.

--Finally, the nonprofit organizations sector grew from 11 million in 1963 to 70 million in 1984, a 536 percent increase.

In conclusion, we can say:

The industrial sector was the pre-eminent sector in realizing overall production as of 1975, something that demonstrates the government's intent to develop this vital sector and to redistribute the national economic structural composition in favor of the commodity sectors.

There is a kind of equilibrium in the sectors' contribution to production that guarantees coordination among them. The commodity sectors' contribution in the 1984 production is expected to be about 56 percent and the contribution of the commodity service sector is expected to drop to 29 percent and the noncommodity services sectors to 15 percent.

Table 1. Production, Gross $\overline{\text{Domestic}}$ Product, Net Product & Overall Capital Formation at Current Prices, 1963-1984 (in millions of Syrian pounds)

	1963	1970	1975	1980	1982	1983 Initial	1984 Projected
Production	6,455	10,278	30,489	82,732	115,582	124,743	131,424
Gross Product	4,425	6,848	20,711	51,799	71,727	77,098	81,446
Net Product	4,249	6,543	20,129	50,356	69,611	74,982	79,080
Overall Capital Formation	529	897	5,156	14,116	16,270	18,139	19,227

Table II. Production, Gross $\overline{\text{Domestic}}$ Product, Net Product & Overall Capital Formation at Fixed Prices for 1975 (in millions of Syrian pounds)

	1963	1970	1975	1980	1982	1983 Initial	1984 Projected
Production	13,048	17,199	30,489	43,529	50,483	53,005	54,760
Gross Product	8,690	10,921	20,711	28,277	30,350	31,510	32,578
Net Product	8,199	10,258	20,129	27,303	29,193	30,500	31,500
Overall Capital Formation	1,588	1,906	5,156	7,537	8,866	9,614	9,962

Table III. Production, Gross $\overline{\text{Domestic}}$ Product, Net Product, Overall Capital Formation at Fixed Prices for 1980 (in millions of Syrian pounds)

	1963	1970	1975	1980	1982	1983 Initial	1984 Projected
Production	22,921	32,640	58,808	82,732	92,310	100,494	103,478
Gross Product	14,834	20,578	40,003	51,799	58,957	60,234	62,137
Net Product	14,106	19,595	39,140	50,356	57,236	58,490	6,323
Overall Capital Formation	2,660	3,192	8,636	14,116	14,896	16,391	17,045

Table IV. Production According to Ownership

Year	Public	Private	Total
1963	2,254	4,201	6,455
1970	4,564	5,714	10,278
1975	16,873	13,616	30,489
1980	44,437	38,295	82,732
1982	63,447	52,136	115,582
1983 Initial	67,908	56,835	124,743
1984 Projected	72,283	59,141	131,424

Table V. Overall Production According to Sectors at Current Prices, 1963-1984
(in millions of Syrian pounds)

	1963	1970	1975	1980	1982	1983 Init.	1984 Proj.
Agriculture	1,437	1,756	4,413	12,810	17,871	20,076	20,826
Ind. & Mining	1,991	3,280	8,933	23,614	36,052	37,819	38,630
Build. & Constr.	310	542	2,602	9,683	12,142	13,580	14,665
Wholesale, Ret.	1,126	1,637	5,160	14,345	18,993	21,399	22,895
Trnsp., Commo. & Storage	461	931	3,098	5,653	8,733	9,389	10,200
Finance, Ins., & Real Est.	475	780	1,574	3,479	4,556	4,373	4,720
Soc., Personal Services	77	145	346	1,221	1,890	2,017	2,218
Gov't. Serv.	567	1,187	4,338	11,878	15,287	16,027	17,200
Nonprofit Services	11	19	25	46	57	63	70
Total	6,455	10,278	30,489	82,732	105,582	124,743	131,424

Table VI. Overall Production Composition According to Sectors at Current Prices
1963-1984 (in %)

	1963	1970	1975	1980	1982	1983 Init.	1984 Proj.
Agriculture	22	17	15	15	15	16	16
Ind. & Mining	31	32	29	29	31	30	29
Build. & Constr.	5	5	9	11	11	20	11
Wholesale & Ret.	18	16	17	18	16	17	17
Trnsp., Commo. & Storage	7	9	10	7	8	7	8
Finance, Ins. & Real Est.	7	8	5	4	4	4	4
Soc. & Personal Services, Gov't Services, & Non- profit Orgs.	10	13	15	16	15	15	15
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

12502

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SYRIA

SIGNIFICANT ROAD EXPANSION NOTED IN LAST 4 YEARS

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 10 Mar 85 p 3

/Article by Hasan Muhammad Wiqaf: "A Tremendous Quantitative and Qualitative Jump Realized by the Revolution in the Field of Major Roads and in Provinces: 700 Km of Major Roads and 5,500 Km of Local Roads Built in Last 4 Years"/

/Excerpts/ March, the month of renewed giving, is here again. From year to year, the month of March grows, the nation grows and we all grow.

And so our country gives profusely through the life arteries vitalized by the 8 March revolution, the revolution of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party, thanks to the wide leadership of the struggline comrade, Hafiz al-Asad, the builder of modern Syria.

The Year 1984

In 1984, 35.5 million Syrian pounds were appropriated for Damascus Province, 22 million of which was utilized as of September 1984. On the municipal level, the municipality of Darayya received 8 million pounds, 4.5 million of which have already been used. Al-Tall municipality received 2.2 million pounds; al-Zabadani municipality, 1.5 million; Duma municipality, 75. million; and al-Nabk municipality, 4 million. These appropriations have been used in full for road building and maintenance. In 1984 alone, 45 million pounds were spent in Damascus Province. Aleppo has been allocated 87 million pounds, out of which 65 million has been spent on the afore-mentioned /building, paving, asphaltting, repair/ works.

Furthermore, the provinces of Idlib, Ladhikiyah, Tartus, Hims, Hamah, Dayr al-Zawr, al-Hasakah, al-Qamishli, al-Raqqah, Dar'a, al-Suwayda' and al-Qunaytirah received 423.2 million Syrian pounds, of which 399.7 million were spent in 1984 as of September of that year.

In 1980, 16,290 km of local rural roads were built, of which 9,635 km were asphalt, 3,977 km paved and 2,678 km dirt roads. In 1984, 21,796 km of roads were built, of which 13,372 km were asphalt, 5,259 paved and 3,225 km dirt roads, according to Dr Amal Abu Ayyash, director of planning in the Ministry of Communications, who added:

"The major roads built in 1980 totaled 4,527 km, 239 km of which were autostrads, while in 1984, 5,230 km were built, 481 of which were autostrads.

This means that the major roads increased by a 3.7 percent annual rate while the rural roads grew at a rate of 7.6 percent annually despite the growth rate of 4.9 percent annually set by the 5-year plan. This demonstrates the importance the political leadership attaches to the development of the countryside and the agricultural areas. In 1984, 598.4 million Syrian pounds were spent on roads.

The difference between the major and rural networks is summed up in that the major roads are the international roads and the ones that link the provinces' administrative districts, as well as the economically important roads.

Economic Roads

Several economically-important roads are now under construction, some of which are:

--The Jablah-al-Ghab road, which is 45 km long. This road is difficult to build because it is in a mountainous area. It costs 140 million pounds and is being built by the Syrian Highway Department. As of the end of 1984, 20 km were completed. This road links the Syrian coast to the central area in the al-Ghab Plain and serves as well some villages and administrative districts such as 'Ayn al-Sharqiyah, Mujamma' Bayt Yashut /or Bayt Yashut Complex/ and Hillat 'Arab. This is mirrored by the vitalization of the neighborhoods of those areas which were neglected and deprived of good roads. This road is also important from the economic and touristic point of view. Looking at the transportation between the provinces, the Jablat al-Ghab road is the shortest one linking the provinces of Hamah and al-Ladhiqiyah and is economically profitable, particularly since it is used to transport agricultural and industrial products and facilities exportation through al-Ladhiqiyah Port. This road is scheduled for completion by the end of 1986.

--The Aleppo-al-Yu'rubiyah road, 490 km long, is classified as a major road although it has a local character as well. It passes through the areas of al-Bab, Manbij, Qarah Qawzak, 'Ayn 'Isa, Qantari, Tall Tamir, al-Qamishli, Tall 'Alu and al-Yu'rubiyah. It links the provinces of Alepp, al-Raqqah and al-Hasakah and is classified as first-class. It costs 543 million pounds. This road helps in the development of the northeastern area and may be used as an international transit road. Most of its parts, save for the 'Ayn 'Isa-Qantari segment, which has not yet been started, and the Tall Tamir-Qamishli and Qamishli-Tall 'Alu segments, are scheduled for completion by the end of the 5-year plan. It is noteworthy that the highway company is building the greatest part of this huge project.

Dr Amal Abu Ayyash added that a number of projects will be included in the sixth 5-year plan, such as al-Salamiyah-al-Rusafah-al-Raqqah project, which is 200 km long and costs about 200 million pounds. It will link the two provinces of Hamah and al-Raqqah, passing through al-Rusafah. It is aimed at linking the northern area with the central and southern areas through the shortest way possible and at vitalizing the Syrian desert between Hamah and al-Raqqah, not to mention its economic importance.

Role of Public Sector Companies

The public sector companies are building the major central roads, the autostrads to link the provinces, up to the borders with Arab and /other/ neighboring countries. They are also building and maintaining the roads that link the administrative districts, the municipal districts, the cities and suburbs with the major roads, in addition to building and maintaining urban roads and beautifying these urban areas with parks.

The Syrian company, during the last 6 years, completed 888 million Syrian pounds worth of road construction, 354 million of which was spent on work in the countryside. The Syrian Highway Company in 1984 alone completed 250 million pounds worth of road work, 85 million of which was spent on roads that serve the countryside.

In 1984, the Syrian Highway Company set up a branch in Jablah to handle the following tasks:

- Completion of the coast-al-Ghab project on schedule.
- Participation in building the coastal autostrad in the Baniyas area.
- All road projects related to technical services and urban and rural municipalities.

The company also created a department for the Aleppo projects group to handle the following tasks:

- Completion of filling the central trench between the cities of Saraqib and Aleppo.
- Completion of the Aleppo detour.
- Completion of the corridor parallel to the Aleppo international airport runway.

The other public sector companies are also building a number of roads, some of which are:

--The Damascus-Jordanian border autostrad. This road is 104 km long with an estimated cost of 580 million pounds. It is being built by the Jabal Qasiyun Company in cooperation with the Syrian Highway Company.

--The Hims-Tartus autostrad. The overall cost of this project is estimated at 420 million pounds. The Ministry of Communications has signed a contract with the General Highway Company to build this project, which is scheduled for completion by the end of 1985.

This review of the transportation and communication sector demonstrates the following:

--Priority is being given to completing the roads that are under construction. The fifth 5-year plan gives priority to completing projects carried over from the previous plan. The only new highway project is the al-Ladhiqiyah-Tartus road which is planned for the 3d year of the plan and for which funds have been appropriated. Most of the projects carried over from the previous plan are expected to be completed during this plan.

--The average growth rate of the road network is set at 4.9 percent annually with emphasis on raising the standard of this network by paying more attention to maintenance.

--The average growth rate of the asphalt road network in the 5-year plan is estimated at 7 percent annually. This rate is higher than the planned rate. The average growth rate is 4 percent for the major asphalt road network and 8 percent for the local asphalt network. This is due to the emphasis being placed on the local highways.

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CSO: 4404/318

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

BRIEFS

DUBAI ALUMINUM, GOLD EXPORTS--Dubayy, 17 May (WAKH)--Dubai exports of aluminum recorded a slight decrease during 1984. Exports showed a 4.7 percent decrease in quantity and a 5 percent increase in value. Statistics released by the Dubayy chamber of trade and industry indicate that Dubai's exports of aluminum totaled 140,000 tons, worth 716.9 million dirhams, compared to 147,000 tons in 1983, worth 683 million dirhams. Dubai's gold imports during 1984 recorded a 53.5 percent decrease in weight and a 40.7 percent decrease in value. Figures in 1984 were 3.12 million grams, worth 170.6 million dirhams, as compared to 6.69 million grams, in 1983, worth 290.9 million dirhams. Gold prices in the UAE ranged between 35 and 40 dirhams per gram early this year. [Text] [Manama WAKH in Arabic 0905 GMT 17 May 85 GF]

CSO: 4400/161

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

ABYAN LAHIJ AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS MOVE AHEAD

Aden 14 UKTUBAR in Arabic 28 Mar 85 p 3

[Article by 'Abdallah al-Shaddadi and Muhammad al-Barhi: "Four and a Half Million Dinars--Allocations for Abyan Governorate Projects in the Past Year"]

[Text] Financial credits to the agricultural and fishery sector in Abyan governorate for the year 1984, the 4th year of the second 5-year plan, reached 4,567,193 dinars. The proportion of expenditures for projects authorized in the plan reached 83.percent: 300,000 dinars allocated for fishery resources projects; 1,366,000 dinars for construction and regulation of traditional irrigation devices; 156,000 dinars for banana raising; 53,375 dinars for instruction and improved agricultural systems; 22,240 dinars for fruit raising; and 56,000 dinars for crop protection. The last three projects suffer from lack of financing, since the allocation for them will not mean the carrying out of their obligations. Furthermore, since they are especially connected with agricultural improvement and development, they should be given sufficient attention. In the plan there are other important projects that will have a large share in the development of agriculture--e.g. irrigation projects, represented by the building of dams, such as the Batis dam, for which 1,020,000 dinars have been allocated, and the Ahwar dam, 1,367,000 dinars. These dams will play an effective role in conserving seasonal stream water to irrigate lands, in the prevention of its escape into the sea, and in regulating the distribution of seasonal stream water into the principal and branch canals. Other new projects that have emerged in the past year are the project for potato raising, for which 231,000 dinars have been allocated, and the anti-desertification project, for which 266,000 dinars have been allocated. The importance of the potato raising project lies in the improvement of production and the expansion of potato farming in order to provide self-sufficiency in this commodity. The anti-desertification project will deal with soil degradation that leads to a lowering of production.

One can see how important the agricultural development projects are by their diversity. Here we shall examine the projects that have been implemented. The fruit raising project has been 98 percent implemented. Fifty thousand papaya seedlings have been raised, 3,000 seedlings grafted, and

areas suitable for fruit raising have been prepared. The proportion [of the plan] realized for mango production was 150 percent; for papaya, 150 percent; and for lemons, 90 percent. In the anti-desertification project, whose purpose is to solve the problems of al-Qawz in Mudiya and of similar plantations which suffer from desertification, a topographical survey of the plantation has been made, along with measures that will assure operation and success of the project. Fifty feddans of the plantation have been surveyed, 50 other feddans resurveyed, and an experiment to raise potato production has been advanced in cooperation with the Center for Agricultural Research. The banana raising project has realized a production exceeding that of 1983: production in 1984 reached 8,179 tons 266 kilos, in spite of certain difficulties, the most prominent of them being the cut off of diesel fuel, the delay by the excavating agency in digging wells, the rise of the cost of a well to 14,000 dinars, and the importation of uneconomical pumps. The objective implementation rate in the past year reached 118 percent, the implementation rate for the traditional irrigation project reached 110 percent, the implementation rate for the project for instruction and improved agricultural systems reached 114 percent, 105 percent for the anti-desertification project and the implementation rate for the building of the Batis dam 112 percent. From these figures one can be assured of the success of the agricultural projects in accomplishing their plans, and this bodes well for the development of the agricultural sector. What is needed is that the Ministry of Agriculture devote increased attention to the projects that suffer from a lack of financing, so as to effect an agricultural resurgence.

The 13th of August Cooperative in Lahij Governorate Fulfills All Its Obligations

The general commission of the 13th of August Cooperative reviewed the progress of the cooperative's activity and its accomplishment in implementing its organizational, production, marketing, and financial plans during the past year, 1984, at the eighth election meeting of the commission, which was held last Friday in the hall of Nasir College for Agricultural Science in al-Hawtah, Lahij governorate. In attendance were Comrade Muhammad 'Abdallah al-Salihi, general director of cooperatives in the Ministry of Agriculture and Agricultural Reclamation, Comrade Sa'id Sha'if, second secretary of the AFID [Federation of Democratic Yemen Farmers] organization in Lahij governorate, and a number of officials.

The meeting began with a brief orientation address, after which the Comrade Director of the cooperative read the annual general report which was presented to the meeting. The report shed light on the entire activity of the cooperative. On the production side, an area of 2,454 feddans was planned for cultivation. It was expected that their yield in food and cash crops would reach 6,410 tons. However, because of drought and fungus diseases, it was possible to plant only 1,365 feddans of the total planned area. Actual total production was 2,327 tons. The cooperative marketed 396 tons 543 kilos through government marketing, and 437 tons 569 kilos through cooperative marketing; 756 tons 756 kilos were sold to the tomato [canning] factory, and 103 tons 708 kilos of medium-staple cotton to the

spinning and weaving factory. Other quantities of products were marketed by individual farmers themselves.

The report indicated that the production units, numbering 25, played a large role in realizing the indicated proportion of the cooperative's plan, since their total production reached 1,098 tons. The report made it clear that among the total number of units, 9 were especially outstanding in production, realizing a monetary return of 25,471 dinars from their production during the 1983-84 agricultural season.

On the financial side, the report made it clear that the cooperative was able to pay all its tax obligations and production quotas to the state, which amounted to 5,297 dinars for the year 1984, and which were completely paid. The cooperative also discharged its obligations to social and health insurance, which amounted to 30,033 dinars.

Also, the cooperative advanced a sum of 487 dinars to support the program of introducing electrical services to the villages of the cooperative, and a sum of 185 dinars to support the activity of mass organizations. The members discussed and approved the report and then the draft reports and recommendations. After discussion and amendment, it was approved as a program for the future activity of the cooperative. The most prominent decisions issuing from the meeting aimed at an increase of agricultural production, the improvement of it in quality and quantity, and a strengthening of the relationship between the leadership of the cooperative and the producing farmers engaged on the land.

Afterwards, the representatives elected a 13-member administrative council for the cooperative, and a 5-member supervisory committee. From the first meeting of the council, Comrade Hasil 'Ali al-Zughayri was re-elected president of the council and director of the cooperative.

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CSO: 4404/311

20 JUNE 1985

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

INDUSTRY MINISTER DISCUSSES ACCOMPLISHMENTS, PLANS

Aden 14 UKTUBAR in Arabic 7 Apr 85 p 3

[Interview with 'Abdallah Muhammad 'Aziz, member of the Central Committee and minister of industry; on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the creation of the ministry, 4 April 1985, place not specified]

[Text] On 4 April 1985, the Ministry of Industry celebrated the first jubilee anniversary of its founding. A representative of 14 UKTUBAR conducted a special interview with Comrade 'Abdallah Muhammad 'Aziz, member of the Central Committee and minister of industry, in which he discussed a number of important matters relating to the economy and to future projects and programs for the development of the industrial sector.

[Question] It is widely known that there was no base for industrialization in the republic--before independence, that is--unless we are allowed to consider the Aden refinery a factory. What, in your opinion, are the bases which our party took into consideration when it set its eyes on the establishment of industry in the republic?

[Answer] When our country obtained independence on the eve of 30 November 1967, there was no industry to speak of in our country, except for the Aden refinery, the extraction of salt, and a few manual workshops. At that time there was concentration on the service sectors in the city, and the rural areas were deprived of any economic activity to speak of. In the face of this backward economic reality and the difficulties arising from it, and after the glorious corrective step of 22 November, a large number of measures were taken to strengthen economic and social development operations in general in the republic, and industrialization in particular. In November 1969, decrees were issued nationalizing the top of the economy in order to free the national economy from the control of foreign monopolies. On this basis, the public sector was created. This made it possible to direct the country's scarce resources toward the needs of development in general and toward industrialization in particular. The creation of the public sector provided the state with a firm basis for realizing its subsequent economic policies.

On the other hand, laws designed to strengthen and encourage industry were promulgated, beginning with the law of economic organization for the

public sector and of national planning, and continuing with the law for industrial organization and for the encouragement of industrial investment, the foreign trade law, the customs law, and finally the law creating the Ministry of Industry--but it is not our purpose to detail this aspect here.

Taken as a whole, these measures formed the bases and the necessary conditions for the beginning of the real period of industrialization in our country.

[Question] The first 3-year plan, as a nucleus for planning in our country, proposed a number of industrial projects, ones which appeared for the first time in the republic. What, in your opinion, is the ministry's evaluation concerning the question of creating these production facilities even though some of them were set up without feasibility studies?

[Answer] The 3-year plan of 1971/72-1973/74 aimed at dealing with the heavy legacy and economic difficulties left behind by the colonial regime. Among these was a high rate of unemployment and of service activity in the city, together with the absence of the basic structure necessary for development. For the first time in the history of Democratic Yemen, 14 factories were constructed to provide needed consumer products as a substitute for imports. Also, the structure of the working class in the country came to include industrial workers as a broad base whose role in building and leading the national economy will become more important with the growth of industry. The 3-year plan also helped to develop the skills of the local cadres in matters of planning and development.

A number of the factories constructed during the implementation of the 3-year plan have achieved notable success; others continue to suffer from various technical and technological difficulties. One may nevertheless say that the majority of consumption and production choices contained in the 3-year plan were reasonable, if we take into consideration the difficult economic circumstances which the country was going through at the time and the need to give employment to those out of work.

There was also a lack of studies, statistics, and trained cadres accompanying the circumstances of preparation to implement the plan. It is within the framework of this lack that one can explain the deficiencies that accompanied the preparation of the plan or the insufficient preparations attending upon its drafting and implementation.

[Question] Without doubt, the Ministry of Industry has acquired extensive experience in the problem of preparing and drafting its economic plans through working with the first 3-year plan and with the first and second 5-year plans. What, in your view, are the reasons for the observable progress in the planning of your ministry's projects?

[Answer] In the course of the 10 years that have elapsed since its creation, the Ministry of Industry has acquired a not to be underestimated experience in the planning of industrial projects, and this fact is reflected positively on the level of implementation of planned projects.

This development can be attributed to the following factors;

The expert technical cadres that are responsible for planning and implementing industrial projects;

--Attention to economic and technical feasibility studies and to market surveys before the decision to invest;

--Attention to training and qualification problems in relation to industrial planning, and taking advantage of available opportunities;

--Ascertaining that the requirements for incorporating a given project into the framework of the plan have been fulfilled, or the assurance first that they will be fulfilled.

[Question] The aim of planning is to know the anticipated rate of growth, whether of national income, individual income, or other economic indices. Would it be possible to set out the growth rates achieved by industry in the past year?

[Answer] If we take 1974 as a base year, then the growth rates for the years 1975-1984, compared with the base year in regard to value of production, labor force, average annual wage and investments, are shown in the accompanying table.

[Question] Without doubt, the ministry has acquired outstanding experience in many fields through technical and economic study and implementation of projects, and through resolving the bottlenecks that existed in some factories. Would it be possible for us to become acquainted in a comprehensive way with the impression of the ministry upon these fields?

[Answer] The ministry is directly responsible for drafting and preparation for the establishment of industrial projects--and that over the various stages of the projects, beginning with study of the opportunity; then study of economic and technical advantage, frequently drawing for assistance on the experience and advice offered by Arab and international organizations; passing on to evaluation of the studies, the drafting of invitations to submit bids, evaluation of the bids received, and then to negotiation and entering into contract with the chosen companies; and finally, direct supervision over the implementation phases of the projects and verification of the soundness and appropriateness of the project designs.

Also, the ministry is frequently responsible for the studies needed to make the decision to move or replace [facilities] in order to develop existent factories.

With regard to the resolution of bottlenecks, the ministry has a share in providing needed assistance to factories, whether through its own cadres, or by experts called upon for this purpose.

[Question] At the present time, and in the midst of preparations for the holding of the third general convention of the Yemeni Socialist Party, and the preparations for drafting the indices of the third 5-year plan-- what, in your opinion, is the outlook for industrial development? And what are the most outstanding projects that you will be able to take up in the coming plan?

[Answer] The ministry has completed studies concerning a number of projects, and measures have in fact already begun to call for bids or to negotiate with the chosen companies. The most prominent of these projects are:

- cement
- cookies and candy
- soap and industrial detergents
- aluminum and domestic products from teflon and steel
- development of the spinning and weaving factory
- development of the public salt corporation
- tire renewal
- shampoo
- carbonated water (Hadramawt governorate)
- development of the weavers' cooperative (Shabwah governorate)

Production from these projects is expected to begin during the first 3 years of the third 5-year plan.

Furthermore, there are a large number of projects under preparation or evaluation. Of these, we might mention:

- production of vegetable oils and fats
- glass
- electrical wire
- liquid and dry batteries
- plastic pipe and plastic sprinkling units
- plaster
- drugs
- cartons
- toothpaste and shaving cream

as well as other studies.

We hope that the third 5-year plan will also witness the implementation of these projects due to their economic benefit.

[Question] The creation of a complete national industry depends basically on the raw materials available in the republic. This is one of the problems that came up for discussion in the consultative meeting held recently. What, in your opinion, are the necessary conditions that must be present for the creation of such industry?

[Answer] There is no doubt about the soundness of the policy calling for a strengthening of the turn toward the creation of industry dependent on locally available raw materials. These industries would include:

- food processing plants dependent on agricultural products
- production of building materials
- extraction and mining.

However, the realization of this policy is dependent upon the following:

- provision of agricultural commodities in quantities sufficient to assure economical operations of the factories;
- completion of geological surveys and determination of the most appropriate sites in respect to size and types of reserve;
- proximity of these sites to places where basic structures and services such as roads, electricity, water, labor, etc. are available.

[Question] Some factories are experiencing particular crises in marketing their products, either because analogous commodities are available, or for other reasons. What are the appropriate treatments to solve such problems, especially in view of our knowledge that this stock causes a pile up and accumulation of funds that might have been made use of in other ways? What is the relationship of the Ministry of Industry to the other ministries in solving such problems? And what agency do you believe ought to play a prominent role in preventing such a situation?

[Answer] In accordance with the decision of the Central Committee made at its eighth session, in April 1980, factories market their products through three outlets: the public sector, the cooperative sector and the private sector. Still, there is a feeling that more efforts on this side are needed, whether on the part of the factories themselves with regard to expanding their marketing area and going regularly to the governorates in search of agents, or through intensified efforts by the commercial organizations and agencies to play a greater role in the marketing of local products.

We know for a certainty that a good arrangement between the leadership of the ministries of industry and commerce is in need of greater actual cooperation between the organizations themselves in order to overcome the difficulties in marketing the products of local industry.

[Growth Rates for 1975-1984, Using 1974 as Base]

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Value of industrial production	--	14.4%	130.5%	44.8%	16.1%	1.1%	12.3%	9.4%	17.4%	7.8%	8.6%
Number of workers	--	26.6%	98.1%	22.1%	6.1%	4.6%	6.0%	2.8%	13.4%	0.4%	0.4%
Average yearly wage	--	4.2%	3.1%	14.4%	23.8%	27.8%	20.9%	16.4%	10.9%	9.9%	---
Investments	--	65.7%	116.2%	94.7%	52.0%	26.0%	80.1%	7.3%	52.4%	20.6%	4.0%

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AFGHANISTAN

WOMEN PLAYING VARIOUS SOCIAL ROLES

Kabul ANIS in Dari 7 Mar 85 p 1

[Text] Tomorrow is the 8th of March, The International Women's Solidarity Day. This day is born of the sacrifices that the world's struggling and progressive women have made for their own liberation and freedom.

In our country, prior to the victory of the national democratic Sawr revolution and its new and evolutionary stage, with the exception of the "court ladies!", women throughout the land were faced with various deprivations. That is to say, neither the slightest attention was given to their illiteracy nor did any opportunity exist for the treatment of their illnesses.

Prior to the revolution, the only political-social organization that defended women's rights was the PDPA and the AWDO (Afghan Women's Democratic Organization). We are now on the eve of the latter's twentieth anniversary. Following the victory of the national democratic Sawr revolution and the beginning of its new, evolutionary stage, the AWDO was strengthened as the true defender of all the rights of deprived and oppressed women. Taking refuge in this sure pillar of support, women--half of Afghans' society--made productive efforts to remove the backwardness existing in women's lives. The AWDO conference in our country is interpreted as a turning point in the history of the women's movement. Through its policy and prudence, the democratic movement of Afghan women entered a new qualitative and evolutionary phase.

At this time in the ranks of the AWDO there are 4,345 workers, 1,600 women farmers, 11,121 intellectuals and employees, 11,947 students, approximately 30,000 women in all. Of these 5,283 have gained PDPA membership.

This improvement of various aspects of women's life is a concern of the PDPA and the revolutionary government. With regard to the DRA's constitution, which was approved in May 1980 and put into effect, in its 26th Article it points to this principle as follows:

"The mother of the family, and children are specially supported by the government. The government gives special attention to the health of mother and child, and adopts the necessary policies to create extensive conditions for women to engage in study, business, trade and work preparation."

Since women have an outstanding part in building a new and progressive society, literacy must be spread among women so that they are better able to carry out their role. Thus, in order to accomplish this hope, 2500 literacy classes have been established for women and 15,006 women are enrolled in them. In this way women can gain a sufficient knowledge of the ways of social life, and take a proper part in presenting sincere and heroic children to society. Since the criminal counterrevolutionary elements, these enemies of the women's movement, would never want women to become literate and participate in the performance of societal affairs, they are striving through threats and poisonous propaganda to persuade our country's combatant women to trample on this sacred process. Yet their sinister aims and inhuman plans have come to nought because their actions were full of spiteful motives and without effect.

Current women's educational centers have been created so that volunteers of literacy courses can attend and thereby raise the level of their knowledge. These centers additionally teach women trades such as typing, sewing, rug-weaving and embroidery, so that on the one hand they gain literacy and on the other, strengthen their household economy through the growth of national industries. These warrior women of Afghanistan, who have inherited the valor and bravery of Malali Zarghunah, Rabe'ah, Nazvana, Sepinah Ada and other heroines of history, have worked in the factories and production facilities to defend the gains of the national democratic Sawr revolution, and have also established the freedom of the country and protection of the people's rights. They have mobilized in the Revolution Defenders Groups, of which the warrior women in Jaji Meydan, Mesrabad of Jowzjan, Basus and Qarah Kutarmi, Takhar and Emamsaheb are living examples.

While we praise the patriotic sentiments of our country's brave daughters, we congratulate them on Women's International Solidarity Day.

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CSO: 4665/70

AFGHANISTAN

WOMEN CELEBRATE EQUAL RIGHTS

Kabul ANIS in Dari 7 Mar 85 p 2

[Text] This year is the 85th time that 8th of March is being celebrated throughout the world by national democratic organizations and progressive workers' parties as International Day of Women's Struggle to secure peace, democracy, social progress and equal rights with men.

Our revolutionary country is celebrating The International Women's Day at a time when the bases of the toilers' revolutionary power and its democratic legality has been strengthened in our country and notable victories are being gained by the beloved, heroic party and our revolutionary government in all fields.

From the first day of its founding, the PDPA advanced towards organizing women and has striven to mobilize them around the Afghan Women's Democratic Organization (AWDO).

The AWDO, as the vanguard and organizer of the country's revolutionary women's movement, the true and natural ally of the PDPA, simultaneously with the party unfurled the banner of struggle against reaction of imperialism and social inequality. It has held this banner and has actively and determinedly shared in making the Saur revolution victorious and in advancing the lofty and progressive goals of the revolution in spite of difficult circumstances.

For the first time in our country's history, the liberating Saur revolution provided the possibilities and real conditions for the participation of women in the building of a new society and their participation in socio-political life.

The first national conference of AWDO was held in Kabul in 1980, in which representatives from provincial women's organizations, representatives of women from friendly socialist countries, and representatives from other countries' national and democratic organizations participated. They proved in action their solidarity with the AWDO.

In the years following the victory of the Saur revolution, every day the country's women conquered new fields of life and performed a constructive role in production and economic fields. The women of our country see sure guarantees of their happy and prosperous life in the revolution's process, and they are correctly carrying out their share of defending the revolution and its achievements.

Praise to the bondage-breaking Saur revolution which put the freedom of women and the ensuring of equal rights with men at the top of its list of revolutionary work and struggle. It is steadfastly advancing on this path with practical steps.

While Afghanistan's revolutionary women congratulate women worldwide on 8 March, Women's International Solidarity Day, they loudly shout slogans against reaction, imperialism, exploitation, militarism and warmongering.

Afghanistan's revolutionary women will never forget the righteous and humane struggles of Kolaraz Tekin, the founder of 8 March, and her helpers, who carried out tireless struggles for peace and against war.

More so than at any other time the world is threatened by war and annihilation. Afghanistan's women, in unison with those women and heroic mothers who have raised a cry for peace, are shouting slogans to end the war and bring about the victory of peace and social justice.

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CSO: 4665/70

AFGHANISTAN

VARIOUS PUBLIC WELFARE PROJECTS INCREASE

Kabul HEYWAD in Dari 4 Mar 85 p 2

[Text] During the current year the Ministry of Public Works has been active in 81 construction projects and 72 various other projects. Its annual plan has been allocated 2,687 billion afghanis.

According to a source at the Ministry of Public Works, among the aforementioned projects there are 10 housing projects, 13 road and public square building projects, 9 industrial projects and 49 public facility projects. During the last 9 months of the current year 110 percent of the plan has been accomplished, showing a 23 percent increase over the first 3 months of 1983-1984.

The source also said: By the end of the current year the Ministry of Public Works will complete and put into operation 25 of the 81 construction projects. The total cost of these 25 projects is 2,000,200,000 afghanis.

Furthermore, in order to honor to the greatest possible degree the twentieth anniversary of the PDPA's founding during the current year the workers and employees of the Ministry of Public Works took a pledge and through their intensive labors 13 projects were completed and delivered to the relevant institutions before the due date. The projects include the first section of the PDPA Central Committee Social Sciences Institute, the second section of the Afshar water distribution project, the No 3 Kamaz transport project, the Bagram Khasht factory, the Road and Public Square Construction Department's industrial facilities, residential housing for Kabul University professors, the Mazar-e Sharif elevator silo, the Mazar-e Sharif customs hangars, dormitory and public bath for Karkar workers, residential housing for employees of the Department of Road and Public Square Construction in Mazar-e Sharif, the first phase of the Herat hospital, the first section of the Herat textile plant, a workers dormitory at the plant, and the Nangarhar Province olive processing project. Moreover, this ministry's workers and employees have completed and put into operation six projects before the due date without any pledge. These include the first section of the petroleum products project in Kabul, the health center in the Panjshir subdistrict, the Rabat-Parian-Herat road, the technical center in Bandar Hayratan, a central workshop for the Department of Road and Public Square Construction in Kabul and an enclosure for the Ministry of Public Health.

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CSO: 4665/68

AFGHANISTAN

BALKH TEXTILE COMPANY MEETS PRODUCTION GOALS

Kabul ANIS in Dari 4 Mar 85 p 2

[Text] The Balkh textile factory, which began production on 25 April 1982, is one of the largest factories producing textiles such as muslin and printed cotton.

A Balkh textile factory source said: The Balkh textile factory has 2,514 workers on three shifts and the capacity to produce 22,174,000 meters of fabric. The factory is equipped with 607 looms, 12 dyeing machines (which have the capacity to dye 25,000 meters of cloth in 24 hours) and other machinery and production equipment.

He said: The Balkh textile plant has taken extensive and productive steps towards raising the level of production by setting up work contests and competitive drives between branches and even between two workers. Thus, in honor of the twentieth anniversary of the PDPA founding, the factory completed its annual plan in 11 months.

He added: Alongside other initiatives and innovations that have been taken in raising the level of production and the national economy, another step has also been taken to make parts from discarded materials. Thus from this source and conservation of electricity and so on, 12,000,000 afghanis have been gained. The Balkh textile plant has won the first place in implementing the six-month plan among all the provinces' textile factories.

He noted: Among the other useful and practical measures that this factory has put into effect is the creation of a second vocation, namely, a number of office workers have begun working in the weaving branches after their regular office hours and have thus challenged their ability in this field.

In answer to a question, the head of the textile factory said: In order to spread literacy, six literacy courses have been organized in which there are about 217 workers inrolled. These courses are being taught by professional teachers and private individuals on an official and volunteer basis.

He said: A two-house dormitory with a capacity of 200 workers is under construction. The first section has been built and the construction of the second unit will be completely finished and will be ready for operation in June 1986.

In order to help the workers, a kindergarten has been set up at the work place in which the children of female employees are taught and cared for. Thus women workers can be busy at their productive work without the slightest worry or anxiety. Furthermore, for the convenience, recreation and relaxation of the workers on the second shift, a room has been equipped with a television set, other equipment and special furniture where the workers can relax during their leisure time.

He explained: At the factory there are the DZ Youth Organization and trade unions. The workers have been organized in these organizations and are becoming a source of valuable service by acquiring knowledge and awareness about the quantity and the quality of the factory's production.

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CSO: 4665/68

AFGHANISTAN

GROWTH, DIRECTION OF BANKING SYSTEM TO KEEP PACE WITH OTHER AREAS

Kabul HEYWAD in Dari 24 Mar 85 p 2

[Text] Keeping in mind that "the country's economic system must develop in a direction that is in full conformity with the interests of the masses of millions," and also that "in plans for the country's social and economic growth, in all financial, banking, and trade activities and in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan's government planning, the people's needs must be secured by observing basic principles." The country's banking activities and affairs must be assessed critically. They must be organized and oriented in such a way that the country's banking activities will unfold at the same pace as the growth of other economic areas--with the aim of serving the interest of the country's toiling masses and staying abreast of the country's profound revolutionary changes.

Although nationalization of the banks will centralize banking activities and will establish permanent supervision by the central bank over the country's other banks, and will enable preliminary steps to be taken for revolutionizing banking activities in the country, it must be admitted that the banking system in the country was established before the revolution on previous principles, and grew only to a limited extent and was not and is not fully responsive to the current needs of the revolution in the country. While the country's banks, especially the central bank (D. Afghanistan Bank) have been able to establish good credibility with the people and provide specific facilities in the commercial transactions of the people, as is evident, the volume of current accounts' deposits, including substantive and non-substantive deposits and non-government savings in the central bank has grown from 8,804 million afghanis in 1357 [21 March 1978-20 March 1979] to 14,007.72 million afghanis in the latter part of the year 1356 [?], showing a growth of 57.53 percent. This in itself shows an increase in the bank's credibility among the people. Likewise, in the years since the triumph of the Sawr revolution and in its new stage, the central bank has been able to a certain extent to control the activities of the other banks, but it is still necessary to increase the role of the banks in managing the country's economy. The methods for credit planning must be converted to a calculated, effective, and progressive system to take into account all aspects of banks' deposits and their use.

Within the framework of plans for the country's economic and social growth, a specific system must be established to achieve a planned balance between bank

income and expenses. As the country's central bank, the D. Afghanistan Bank is obligated by law to exercise serious and goal-oriented control over the financial and economic activities of various governmental institutions and cooperatives in the process of granting credit. It was with the above observations in mind, and other aspects of banking activity, that the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the PDPA assessed the matter of the banks at its 9/29/1363 [20 Dec 1984] meeting. Babrak Karmal, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA and President of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA gave specific guidance; if followed seriously and completely, this guidance can be used to orient and reform banking activities to serve the interests of the toiling people of our country. In this way the banks will serve the toiling people of our nation and raise the level of their well being to the greatest extent possible, and they will be used for the country's economic growth.

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CSO: 4665/74

AFGHANISTAN

LOWGAR PROJECT PROVIDING DRINKING WATER FOR 270,000

Kabul HEYWAD in Dari 24 Mar 85 p 1

[Text] With the arrival of the seventh anniversary of the glorious Sawr revolution, the greater Lowgar ocean water distribution project, at a total cost of 900 million afghanis, has become operational in providing sanitary, potable water for Kabul residents.

This project, which is one of the largest sources of water procurement and distribution in the country, has a distribution capacity of 35,000 cubic meters of water in a 24-hour period. According to the plan, it can provide drinking water for 270,000 persons, at 100 liters per person per 24-hour period.

During inauguration of the water for the great project, Brigadier General Mohammad Rafi', member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Democratic Party of the People of Afghanistan and deputy minister on the Council of Ministers in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, discussed the establishment and operation of the project as regards the needs of Kabul residents for drinking water. Also present at the inauguration were members of the Central Committee of the party, some members of the Council of Ministers of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and a number of chiefs, workers, and employees of the Ministry of Public Works. Rafi' said: Despite the undeclared war which American imperialism has imposed on our country, the party and government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan are making use of every possibility and opportunity to serve the people, and they are implementing one public works project after another according to plan.

After some pertinent remarks were made by Nazar Mohammad, minister of public works, the chiefs of the departments of water distribution, canalization, and construction, and a worker also made some statements. Then a neighborhood elder spoke as a representative of the residents of the area and said: The Lowgar ocean water distribution project, which was delayed from 1351 [21 March 1972-20 March 1973] to 1357 [21 March 1978-20 March 1979] due to the previous governments' negligence, as a result of the efforts of the Democratic Party of the People of Afghanistan and the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and despite the vengeful behavior of the imperialist governments with regard to the continuation of financial assistance for the project vented their animalistic spite against the people of Afghanistan was completed in a short time to make life easier for the residents of Kabul. The completion of

this project is further testimony to the sincerity, service, and righteousness of our revolutionary government towards the nation's laborers, and the steps it takes for their welfare.

At the conclusion of this gathering the deputy prime minister of DRA distributed the gifts, prizes, and letters of appreciation from the Ministry of Public Works to the 73 employees, workers, and engineers who had shown merit and excellence in working to complete this project.

A water distribution and canalization official said: The utilization of this project has doubled Kabul's drinking water supply. This project's water production capacity is determined by ten wells equipped with electrical, diesel and automatic control systems; each well has a capacity of forty liters per second.

The water lines from the pump station to the center of the city use pipes in various widths from 1,200 millimeters to 450 millimeters. At present Vazir Akbar Khan square, Shish Dark Minah, Shahr-e Now, Shahr-e Kohnah, and some other parts of Kabul are connected to the line and make use of its water.

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CSO: 4665/74

AFGHANISTAN

SURVEY, CADAFTER ROLE TO EXPAND LAND, WATER REFORM

Kabul HEYWAD in Dari 31 Mar 85 p 2

/Text/ The report on the method of carrying out the economic and social development plan for the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan /DRA/ in the first quarter of 1363 /21 March-21 June 1984/ states that the plan to implement land and water reforms has seen very little action due to problems of remoteness, the inattentiveness of officials, and especially the lack of survey groups and cadasters in most provinces, and that it has resulted in a very low percentage. Thus far, 1 percent of the plan to distribute land has been implemented, 8 percent of the plan to clear lands, 20 percent of the plan to distribute land deeds, and 11 percent of the plan for returns on crops have been implemented. This level of accomplishment especially in view of the great and undeniable importance of the process of carrying out the democratic land reforms in the economic, social, and political life of our society, does not in any way meet the serious need for the growth of revolutionary changes in our country.

Of course the role of other factors which have caused a delay in the implementation of the democratic land and water reforms must not be ignored, but at the same time it must be acknowledged that a survey and a cadaster are prominent factors in the progress of the democratic land and water reforms in the country, and they have an important role in this area.

Accordingly, the Cadaster and Geodesic Administration has made extensive efforts to eliminate backwardness in this area by taking constructive steps. For example, in the middle of last year this administration held a seminar for the purpose of categorizing needs in the area, and prepared the way for the expansion and intensification of the activities of the administration's survey and cadaster teams where land reforms are being implemented.

The report on this administration's activities says that since the role of the survey and cadaster teams in the land reform operations groups is very important, the leadership of the survey and cadaster teams is in accordance with last year's plan and following the necessary guidance on the implementation of the land and water reforms, the survey and cadaster teams in the operations groups have been able to expand their activities over last year, so that in the first two quarters of last year /21 March-22 September 1984/ 60 survey and cadaster teams in 26 of the country's provinces achieved striking success with the implementation of the democratic land and water reforms, clearing, registering,

and assessing 126,200 acres of land, and annexing 2,700 acres. In addition, the survey and cadaster teams identified, marked off, divided into blocks, and numbered 29,200 acres of private land and 1,300 acres of governmental land, attempting in so doing to make up for plan delays with intensified work.

It must be remembered that the most important part of the activities of the groups implementing the democratic land reform is the identification and separation of agricultural lands, whether private or governmental, and measuring their size, boundaries, and classification. In the initial implementation of the land reform in all the regions and areas, this work will establish the necessary conditions for further implementation and advancement, and it has a role of the utmost importance in the growth and rapid development of the democratic land reform.

The democratic land and water reform operations groups, which are partly composed of the survey and cadaster teams, must not only have the necessary knowledge of their work, they must also have sufficient means for advancement in such matters and they must be given the help they need so that we will be able to obtain the desirable results to the benefit of all the country's workers to achieve the aspirations of the Sawr revolution from the operations groups, who are the chief executors and have the most basic responsibility of the Sawr national democratic revolution.

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CSO: 4665/77

AFGHANISTAN

AGRICULTURAL BANK OFFICIAL ELABORATES ON LOANS TO FARMERS

Kabul HEYWAD in Dari 31 Mar 85 p 2

/Text/ The Agricultural Development Bank has a great responsibility to aid the country's farmers and agricultural cooperatives. Regarding the bank's activities HEYWAD's correspondent interviewed its president and the text of the interview was reported as follows:

/Question/ How many kinds of loans does the agricultural bank have, and under what conditions and at what percent interest rates are they distributed to rural residents?

/Answer/ The Agricultural Development Bank provides three kinds of loans to agricultural coepratives, agricultural enterprises, and individual farmers as below:

1--Short-term loans: The repayment period of these loans is 1 year. They are given at 10 percent interest for the following purposes: The purchase of agricultural materials such as chemical fertilizers, improved grain seeds, pesticides and herbicides, the purchase of small agricultural tools and equipment, livestock fodder, and financing the marketing of agricultural products.

2--Medium-term loans: The repayment period of these loans is up to 5 years. They are given at eight percent interest for the following purposes: The purchase of agricultural machinery (tractors and water pumps), and all other machinery which have a useful life of more than 5 years under ordinary conditions, the purchase of draft animals used in the construction or repair of small irrigation installations and the revival of agricultural lands.

3--Long-term loans: The repayment period of these loans is more than 5 years. They are given for the construction of orchards, vineyards, irrigation systems, farm repairs, and so forth. Of course, the agricultural bank's primary aim in granting loans to the country's farmers and rural cooperatives is to raise the level of agricultural production and animal breeding, and to finance and assist in the strengthening of the financial base of the rural people and rural cooperatives; the loans are given directly to the country's farmers, or indirectly through cooperatives and agricultural enterprises which are active in agricultural process and production. Naturally, the ultimate objective of the bank's assistance is to achieve the revolutionary government's goals in the attainment of self-sufficiency in the production of agricultural products, particularly wheat, in our dear country.

After the victory of the glorious Saur revolution, especially in its new and evolutionary stage, the Agricultural Development Bank of Afghanistan, as the only agricultural credit institution in the country, along with the government's other economic and development organizations makes every effort to develop and improve agriculture and to finance it through agricultural credits.

9310

CSO: 4665/77

IRAN

OVER TWO MILLION TONS OF GOODS IMPORTED VIA USSR

Tehran BURS in Persian 1 May 85 p 8

[Text] In 1984, nearly 2.5 million tons of goods were transported to Iran via the Soviet Union. Of this amount, 650,000 tons were transported to the Caspian Sea through the Volga-Baltic waterway.

On 15 April of this year in Leningrad, the commemorative conference of the representatives of the companies of this shipping line was held on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of its foundation.

One of the most important points in the economic relations between the Soviet Union and Iran is cooperation in the transport of goods. In 1965, as a result of the agreements between the Soviet and Iranian transport agencies concerning the transport of goods from the ports of the Baltic Sea and the North Sea to the Iranian Ports of Anzali and Nowshahr, the Volga-Baltic shipping line to the Caspian Sea was established. Initially, the volume of transportation was not great. While in the opening year of this line, only 50,000 tons of goods were transported, in 1983, this amount increased 23-fold, reaching 1,146,000 tons. On the whole, since the beginning of the operation of this line, nearly 8 million tons of goods have been transported to Iran.

Why is the Volga-Baltic shipping line to the Caspian Sea so popular among the Iranian recipients of these goods? Firstly, because this is the shortest route from the western European ports to Iran. Ships which are loaded in the Ports of Oslo, London, Hamburg, Hanover, Antwerp or in the northern seas for Iran enter Soviet waters through the Neva River. Then they pass through Lake Ladoga, the (Alvir) River and Lake Onega and reach the Volga-Baltic canal. Finally, the ships enter the Volga River and through it the Caspian Sea. This enables the ships which can navigate in rivers and seas to load the goods directly in European ports and bring them to Iran without transferring them. In this way, goods that are loaded on ships during the shipping season in Hamburg travel the whole 3,440 km to Anzali Port in 3

or 4 weeks. From the Scandinavian ports, goods arrive even faster. In 1984, nearly 290,000 [tons] of cargo were transported to Iran by ship.

Secondly, by using this water route, goods are brought to ports that are closer to Tehran. For instance, from Nowshahr to Tehran, it is 210 km and from Anzali Port to Tehran, it is 373 km, whereas the distance between Bushehr to the capital is 1,215 km and the distance from the Port of Imam Khomeyni and Bandar 'Abbas to Tehran is 1,056 km. Therefore, the domestic transportation of the cargo alone is three to four times cheaper. How much does Iran save in this way? Also, a very important point is that the above-mentioned shipping route crosses through a moderate climate, which preserves the goods better.

When, as a result of the 1979 revolution, the United States and its allies announced that they would impose an economic embargo on Iran, the transport of goods via the Soviet Union increased several-fold, which allowed a lessening of the effects on the Iranian economy of the Western punishment.

Although the Volga-Baltic shipping route to the Caspian Sea works with much care and both sides are very satisfied with the transport of goods via the Soviet Union, the representatives of the general union of (Suyuz) transit [company] and the Ministry of Roads and Transport of the Islamic Republic of Iran meet regularly in regards to completing and expanding the transport of transit goods via the Soviet Union. In the previous meeting, which was held from 10-13 December 1984 in Moscow, from Iran, Mr B Shakiba, the director general of the office of transit and agreements of the Ministry of Roads and Transport, as well as the representatives of the Iran and Asia insurance companies and other concerned organizations participated. In this meeting, the necessary steps were taken to improve the transport of transit goods via the Soviet Union.

Twenty years of the success of the Volga-Baltic route to the Caspian Sea is a satisfactory example of mutual beneficial economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and Iran. The experience of the transport of goods via this route has also allowed the transportation to Iran via the Mediterranean to the Baltic Sea route. Ships are loaded directly in the southern ports of Europe with goods for export to Iran and then the products are delivered to Iran via the Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea, the Sea of Azov and the internal rivers of the Soviet Union. Goods are transported to Iran within a period of three weeks.

Every year at the beginning of the shipping season, the central union of (Suyuz) transit of the Ministry of Trade of the Soviet Union holds a conference of the representative companies of this

route; agreements are signed in regards to cooperation; and, in the meetings, the results of the activities of the previous year are evaluated. Also, program renewals for the following year are studied. Participating in the conference commemorating its 20th year, which was held in Leningrad, were the representatives and business partners of the (Suyuz) transit [company] from Iran, the German Democratic Republic, England, France, Spain, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, Holland, and the Federal Republic of Germany. The Iranian representatives are headed by Mr Mehdi Moqadassian, the director of the joint Iran-Soviet transport company (IRSOTR), and Mr 'Ali Nabavi-Nuri, a member of the board of directors of the company.

10,000

CSO: 4640/586

IRAN

FOUNDATION FOR OPPRESSED ANNOUNCES FARM PRODUCTS VOLUME

Tehran BURS in Persian 30 Apr 85 p 4

[Text] With the efforts of the committed employees of the Foundation for the Oppressed in Khorasan, during the past year, more than 3,800 tons of wheat and barley, 13,500 tons of sugar beets and 3,000 tons of dried alfalfa were produced and sent to the silos of the sugar factories of the province and the consumer market.

The head of the agricultural division of the Foundation for the Oppressed in Khorasan announced this statement in an interview with IRNA and added:

Also, with the round-the-clock efforts of the committed employees of the agricultural division of this Foundation, during the past year, 11,500 sheep and 850 cows and calves were raised and 3,000 sheep and 120 cows were sent to the meat markets.

Then, announcing that the agricultural division of the Foundation for the Oppressed in Khorasan is active in the three areas of gardening, agriculture and animal husbandry, he said:

This Foundation covers nearly 1,500 hectares of orchards, the products of which are 90 percent apples and pears, and 65 percent summer produce [as published], including such items as plums, peaches and cherries. With the regular care of the personnel in spraying with pesticides, fertilizing, trimming and irrigation, the level of production increases significantly each year, so that last year, more than 8,000 tons of apples and pears and about 700 tons of summer produce were harvested and sent to the consumer market. In conclusion, announcing that the agricultural division of the Foundation for the Oppressed in Khorasan in four cities of the Province, Shirvan, Torbak Heydariyyeh, Neyshapur, and Sefid Sang of Fariman, is engaged in keeping and raising livestock, he said: This Foundation covers about 12,000 hectares of farms, including confiscated and held lands. Every year about 6,000 hectares of these lands are cultivated with products such as wheat, barley, beets, alfalfa, cotton, and other agricultural products and the remainder are left as fallow land for the next year's cultivation.

IRAN

REYSHAHRI: MINISTRY OF INFORMATION IN SERVICE OF PEOPLE

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 5 May 85 p 18

[Interview with Minister of Information Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohammad Mohammadi-Reyshahri by KEYHAN; date and place not specified]

[Text] We will have some good news to give to the Iranian nation in the next few days.

The arms of the Islamic Republic are open both for those those who have fled abroad and those who are in the country, if they return and, in fact, repent before being arrested and punished by law.

The arms of Islam and the Islamic Republic are open to both those who have fled abroad and those in the country who now realize that out of ignorance they had stood against Islam, the Islamic society, and the Muslim nation of Iran, and if they want to return from the deviant path they have followed, they may.

The issues of moral corruption and the so-called demonstrations that were held in this connection had political roots.

KEYHAN political service. It has been nearly eight months since a new ministry called the "Ministry of Information" was added to the national organizations. The creation of an organized institution and precise planning for such a ministry which did not exist before is a step which requires much attention and unlimited efforts. The people also expect to be informed about such a ministry in order to rise up in support of it, as before, in times of need: For this reason, and in order to

become familiar with the progress of the activities of this ministry, we spoke with Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohammad Mohammadi-Reyshahri, the minister of information, concerning the various problems of this newly established ministry.

In the first exclusive interview, the minister of information responded to KEYHAN's questions concerning the organization, planning procedures and duties of this ministry; the procedures regarding executive affairs; the contact of the people with the intelligence units; the espionage of the hypocrites for Saddam's regime; the exchange of information with other countries; the pardoning of political prisoners; corruption in the hypocrite organization; the inclination of those who fled the country to return; and the repentance of individuals in the country; as well as the street demonstrations against unveiling. Hojjat ol-Eslam Reyshahri said in this interview that in the course of the next few days, some good news will be reported to the nation. He also added that in the Badr operations, eight hypocrites who spied for Iraq were arrested.

The text of the KEYHAN interview with the minister of information follows. Here, we find it necessary to sincerely thank the public relations office of that Ministry and the officials of the minister's office for their cooperation.

In the beginning of the interview, we asked Hojjat ol-Eslam Reyshahri:

Considering that it has been newly established, what is the situation and organization of the Ministry of Information? What are its main duties, and does it have a share in executive affairs?

[Answer] In the name of God the compassionate and the merciful.

In connection with the situation and organization of the Ministry of Information at the present, I must say that given the brief period since the establishment of this newly founded ministry, most of the time of its officials, perhaps 90 percent of their time, is spent on organizational matters, because this ministry is quite new and has had no prior organizational format. From

the very start, when the responsibility of this ministry was conferred on us, a committee called the organizational committee was formed alongside various other committees to organize the ministry, which later on in the organizational format became the [committee on the] management of planning and programs. The duty of the committee on organization or management of planning and programs is to make use of specialized individuals who have served during these few years and gained experience in organizing to engage in planning and determining the future form of this ministry, its duties, and the bylaws for its management and various administrative offices.

Whatever is approved in that committee or management will be subject to final examination by the supreme council of planning and organization in the presence of the minister.

At the present, thank God, I am almost certain of the fact that the organizational chart of the Ministry of Information in Tehran and other cities has been determined, the deputies and the central offices of this ministry have been appointed and a short period of time will be required before it is completed.

Then, concerning the main duties of the Ministry of Information, Hojjat ol-Eslam Reyshahri said: The main duties of the Ministry of Information consist of confronting and preventing counterrevolutionary actions and the activities of the counterrevolutionaries, which, on the whole, are in two dimensions. The first dimension is fighting the counterrevolutionaries. The second dimension concerns preventing the creation and growth of the counterrevolutionaries. In this connection, the counterrevolutionaries can take advantage of the situation and grow or there are grounds that can produce counterrevolutionaries. These are being studied and examined and proposals are being given to the executive organizations to prevent them. However, concerning whether or not the Ministry of Information has an executive responsibility, I must say that the executive responsibility has not been anticipated in the law for the Ministry of Information. The Ministry of Information throughout the world is a Ministry of Information and Security, with security as its executive arm. No such security dimension is anticipated in the law for the Ministry of Information. In other words, it only has an information dimension, gathering and studying information in the areas of its responsibility. Then, in connection with implementing the information, in accordance with the law of the Ministry, all such implementary operations are the responsibility of the agents of the judicial branch. On the whole, the Ministry of Information, the judicial branch and the agents of the judicial branch complement each other. It is through the cooperation and coordination of these three forces that the security of the country is ensured.

We asked: Realizing that the greatest source of information for arresting the armed minigroups is the people and considering the importance and participation of the people in the affairs, what is their role in cooperating with the Ministry of Information?

It was decided that a center would be created in this connection. To what extent has work been carried out in these areas?

The minister of information responded: In connection with the participation of the people in the issue of information, since the Ministry of Information and its intelligence organization in the Islamic Republic is unlike intelligence organizations in other countries, that is, the intelligence organization in the Islamic Republic is at the service of the people and is for the purpose of informing the authorities of what is going on in the country and providing intelligence services to all executive organizations, the people can play a decisive and active role in connection with the responsibilities which are conferred on this ministry. However, the form of the participation of the people in this issue requires planning. God willing, we will determine the manner in which the people can cooperate and participate in connection with the counterrevolutionaries and prevent the grounds for the growth of counterrevolution. God willing, the program for this cooperation will be announced after it is prepared and approved by [the committee for] the management of planning and programs.

In connection with the telephone numbers which are to be put at the disposal of the people, we have offered a proposal to the Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone to put easy three- or four-digit consecutive numbers at the disposal of the ministry. As soon as the Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone responds, we will announce them.

We asked: What is the activity of the Ministry of Information in direct connection with the war, especially in connection with the problem of espionage by the superpowers, which is an issue in all countries and particularly in Iran?

To what extent has the Ministry of Information been active in fighting the intelligence elements of the East and the West? Hojjat ol-Eslam Reyshahri answered:

In connection with the war, the Ministry of Information cannot legally be directly active. In the law for the Ministry of Information, for the military and law enforcement forces, military and law enforcement intelligence has been anticipated. Therefore, the intelligence that the war requires and also the security of the intelligence of the armed forces is the responsibility of the armed forces. But, at present, the Ministry of Information provides some assistance in this area,

especially since I was previously active in the military revolution court and the intelligence organization in accordance with a ratification by the supreme council for defense.

At present, too, the Ministry of Information is relatively active, to some extent, in connection with uncovering the spy networks.

The minister of information then added: In this connection, I must say that with the blows that the unknown soldiers of the Imam of the Age inflicted on the hypocrites and the blows that God inflicted on them through their stupidity (so that they have no place among the people), they need money for their debauchery and crimes and have no choice but to spy and get paid by the regime of Iraq. At present, the important source of support for the hypocrites is through this channel. In other words, Iraq atrociously martyrs and maims the Muslim nation of Iran by nightly bombings and missile attacks. Of course, in addition to the chemical crimes on the fronts, the problem for them is that if they want money and resources, they have no choice but to bring information. And the most important vital information concerns the war. The issue of information is one issue and another is to create sentiments against the war among the people. The hypocrites help Saddam in both connections. In connection with the issue of espionage, we have documents indicating that the supporters and members of the hypocrite organization, that is, the core of the so-called resistance, enter the fronts in various ways and gather information, although this information is not really of a high level. They put such information at the disposal of the regime of Saddam in the Badr operations, according to the information that was given to me. The forces of the Ministry of Information who had gone to help arrested eight hypocrites who were spying for Iraq.

In regard to the second issue, that they imagine they can create anti-war sentiments, as you know, they have not been successful, except for a number of thugs who, like themselves, wanted corruption, and were able to create some noise among a small number of people for propaganda feeding to the counterrevolutionary radios, which magnify it ten times. They were able to disguise what was connected with moral corruption as something against the war in the foreign press. At any rate, in both cases, in order to show their loyalty to the masters who help them, the hypocrites did not hesitate to spy, but they were unable to do anything.

Intelligence Cooperation

We asked: Does the Ministry of Information have foreign contact with other countries in regards to exchanges of information? The minister of information responded: According to the law, for the

Ministry of Information to exchange information with other countries requires the approval of the Cabinet, chaired by the president. In other words, if it wants to exchange information with other countries, it needs the approval of the Cabinet, chaired by the president. Thus far, this has not happened and at present, the Ministry of Information is engaged in no exchange of information with any country.

[Question] In the visit of the personnel of the Ministry of Information with the imam, he referred to the political prisoners, saying that their cases must be examined as soon as possible so that no one remains in prison without just cause. Please tell us, considering the sensitivity of the issue which the imam also pointed out, that is, dealing with the hypocritical and anti-people minigroups, what measures have been taken and essentially what is the procedure for cases involving political prisoners? Concerning the pardoning of political prisoners, what individuals are eligible for it and how will you deal with those who engage in their previous acts after being pardoned?

The minister of information said: We do not recognize them as political prisoners. They are belligerent counterrevolutionaries and political criminals, because a political prisoner is a person whose work is political. A person who takes up arms is no longer engaged in political work, but is a terrorist and criminal in nature. We consider these individuals as counterrevolutionaries.

The imam's statement was made in connection with prisoners who want to be pardoned and does not concern all prisoners. Counterrevolutionary prisoners who want to be pardoned may do so in one of two ways: one is through the four-member committee, which studies the cases, and if the committee determines that a person deserves to be pardoned, his name is placed on the pardon list; another is through the Supreme Court. Of course, both methods come to the same result.

In order to take more care in granting pardons to these individuals, the Ministry of Information and the prosecutors general must give their opinions. The prosecutor general who carries out the ruling must give his opinion as to whether or not the person has reformed and whether or not he will threaten the security of the country if he is freed. Also, the Ministry of Information (which has been aware of the activities of these individuals before their arrest and controls their activities after their arrest through its offices in prisons) must give its opinion as to whether or not these individuals have been reformed and whether their return to the society will pose a threat to the society. The procedure is that the Ministry of Information takes the list of individuals, studies it, and within a period of time proposes pardons for those who have truly repented.

[Question] In most countries, perhaps in all of them, the Ministry of Information is managed as an independent, secret agency. What is the reason for information being a ministry in Iran?

[Answer] I have said this earlier, too, but now I will explain it in more detail. In the countries of the world, the intelligence organizations are the main decision makers in connection with all executive tasks which are carried out in that country. For this reason, given the sensitivity of those organizations and the crimes committed by them in other countries against the people as well as what is done by the intelligence information organizations of the world, such things cannot be explained to the people. Such organizations in other countries neither have laws nor are they in the form of a ministry whose work can be explained in the Majlis or Parliament, even if there is a law, like the law for SAVAK, which consists of one or two words stating that, for instance, such an organization exists and is controlled by some person. But nowhere else in the world do such conditions exist as those over this organization and its head and the limitations and restrictions placed on its activities as determined in the law for the Ministry of Information of the Islamic Republic. If this law falls into the hands of others who work in the information organizations of other countries, they will be surprised and will wonder if it is possible to organize an information organization in this form and, essentially, if an information organization can work in this form, in which the standards of truth and justice are taken into consideration by taking away its executive duties and approving it in this form, and can one work in such an organization? But in the Islamic Republic, considering that all organizations must belong to the people and above all the information organization must be the eyes of all executive organizations and the regime and must belong to the people, it is with consideration for all these issues that the Majlis decided to ratify it as a ministry, so that the work which is done in this ministry can be explained to the Majlis and through it to the people.

The Roots of the Afflictions of the Minigroups

[Question] We have recently heard that the minigroups, particularly the hypocrites, have suffered great afflictions abroad. On the one hand, there was the so-called ideological marriage of the head of this organization along with unacceptable justifications followed by divisions, and so on, as well as the other minigroups and counterrevolutionaries who at one time enjoyed the overall support of the oppressive powers but are now in total isolation. Please tell us what the roots of these events are and, if possible, whether there are new issues in this connection.

Hojjat ol-Eslam Reyshahri responded: I think that in regards to the blood of the pure martyrs who were martyred at the hands of those criminals, including the innocent Hezbollah people in the streets and bazaars and the martyrs of the alter, one of the results of the spilling of that blood is that they have fallen into such afflicted and calamitous times. I do not think we could have done anything to make them so shamed as to be exposed and expelled from the society. We did not have the capability to strike such a blow against them as the blow that God inflicted on them through their own hands, the blow of floating in the cesspool of corruption in that revealing and filthy act which they presented as a marriage, a marriage which took place before the required period of waiting was over. What is even more shameless is that they speak of this act to their supporters as an ideological revolution. This was not something that I believe we could have accomplished; we could not have inflicted such a blow on them. This was an act of stupidity that they have suffered as a result of their limitless crimes, engaging in an act that cannot be justified even to their strongest supporters. The best organizational forces, which for years had put everything they had at their disposal, now have such problems that some of them are hospitalized abroad suffering from psychological problems, and we know about it. Some of them have made our work so easy; they cooperate with us in order to arrest and punish the remainder. God willing, I must say that in the next few days we will have good news for the Iranian nation. Through the blows the criminals have suffered at their own hands, these criminals, criminals who committed great crimes for some time and intended even greater crimes, have been caught by the claws of justice, the details of which will be announced in a few days.

As the next question, our reporter asked: We know that some of those who were active on various levels in the beginning of the establishment of the Islamic Republic and then for certain reasons escaped abroad have expressed their wish to return to the country. What is your opinion in regards to those who want to return and how will you treat them?

The minister of information said in response to our reporter: Both those who fled abroad and those who are in the country who now have truly realized that they stood against Islam, the Islamic society and the Muslim nation of Iran out of ignorance, if they turn from the deviant path that they have followed, the arms of Islam and the Islamic Republic are open and they can return. There is no problem in this regard. We even recommend that they return. Of course, they must return in such a way that the people are convinced that they have returned. They must confess to their errors and confess what blows they inflicted in the past. Of course, if they have violated someone's rights and if they have committed a crime that warrants retribution, this

concerns the victim of the crime. But if, before their arrest and punishment by law, they return and truly repent, the arms of the Islamic Republic are open, both for those who have fled abroad and those who are in the country.

[Question] Recently, certain events took place in connection with the problems of corruption and unveiling in the form of demonstrations and certain problems were created by the opportunists contrary to Islamic laws. Please tell us what the roots of these events were.

[Answer] These problems of moral corruption and the demonstrations that were carried out in this connection had political roots. That is, the minigroups, and most of all the hypocrites, had some plans to begin certain activities in some cities and provinces during the period 21 April-21 May and in the previous month on a trial basis. Again, in this connection, the results backfired and they were unsuccessful. They thought that they could enter with the complaint that the Islamic Republic forces the people to observe public morality and not to seek moral corruption and provoke a number of thugs. Once they found the grounds prepared they would follow this action with a series of activities. These conspiracies were neutralized in the early stages with the cries of the Hezbollah people on the scene. Another issue that I must mention in this connection concerns the neutralization of these conspiracies or the influences of minigroups, which tried with a series of actions to stain the Hezbollah. I do not want to say that the number of these influences was great, but, as you know, a series of actions was carried out which, according to Islam and the laws of the Islamic Republic, should not have been done. Those actions are certainly not the work of the Hezbollah people, but of those who had infiltrated them. Again, the motive behind this action was to stain the Hezbollah.

10,000

CSO: 4640/581

IRAN

MAJLIS APPROVES NEW LAW ON SENDING STUDENTS ABROAD

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 8 May 85 pp 5, 19

[Text] The details of the bill on sending students abroad was ratified by the Majlis after being studied and discussed by the representatives. This bill has been devised to ensure the training and education of the specialized manpower at the higher educational levels and to respond to the increasing needs of the country in technical and engineering fields. The shortage of specialists and instructors in most academic fields, particularly in technical fields, and the lack of specialized and committed manpower in various economic and production sectors are among the main reasons for devising and ratifying this bill. The above-mentioned, since its ratification, has instigated much discussion and expression of opinions. Experts have scrutinized the weak and strong points of this bill and have explained its deficiencies and shortcomings as well as its positive aspects in regards to training the specialized manpower for various industrial and economic sectors. Among the issues that can be discussed in this bill is that of the prohibition against sending single women with bachelor's degrees abroad. In other words, women with bachelor's degrees can only leave the country to continue their education provided they are accompanied by their husbands.

Planning to achieve the independence-promoting economic and cultural goals depends on the training and education of sufficient specialized, committed manpower. At present, the various industrial, agricultural, cultural and educational sectors of the country are faced with a shortage of specialists, planners and professors at high educational levels.

This problem, in addition to slowing down the possibility of rapidly attaining economic and cultural independence, also causes stagnation and halts in beneficial industrial, economic and social activities. The training of experts to use in the various economic, educational and cultural institutions of the country through sending students abroad seems necessary under the present conditions. But in this connection, experts and officials of the educational affairs of the country believe that the manner of sending students abroad was determined by stressing the needs and essential priorities of the society. In the opinion of the education officials, regarding the issue of sending students abroad, in addition to taking the important needs and priorities of the society into consideration, one essential question must be answered: Which foreign countries should our students be sent to in order to bring our society more rapidly and appropriately to the projected economic, cultural and social goals? On the other hand, the writers of the bill on sending students abroad have taken into consideration the question of with what university degrees students will be more competent to be sent abroad and more rapidly than others be able to help the society achieve its intended cultural and educational goals. What is certain is that the authors of the above-mentioned bill have found the training of specialized manpower at levels above the bachelor's degree more important than at other educational levels, especially in technical and engineering fields. In this connection, also, priority is given to men, especially married men, and for cultural and social reasons, the continuation of the education of women with bachelor's or higher degrees abroad will require the permission and accompaniment of their husbands.

A Look at the Details of the Bill

The details of the bill on sending students abroad show that the Majlis, on the basis of the necessity of raising the level of the scientific and technical expertise of the country, has made the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education responsible for sending a number of male students abroad every year, with consideration for the capacity of the universities in the country and the existing currency resources, in order to help provide the committed specialized manpower needed by the country and ensure their acquisition of the scientific innovations of the world and familiarity with the latest experiences of foreign countries in various areas. According to the articles specified in this bill, all things being equal, priority is given to married men. As was referred to earlier, women with bachelor's degrees and above may also apply to study abroad, but with the stipulation that they be accompanied by their husbands. It is necessary to point out that the articles in the bill on sending students abroad make reference to moral competence after the student passes the examination. Students can benefit from currency and grant resources provided they meet this requirement. In the opinion of

the applicants, a clear and fundamental policy concerning sending students abroad prepares the necessary grounds for essential educational and cultural goals. Applicants say: Given that the main goal of sending students abroad is to train and educate a sufficient and necessary specialized manpower and gain familiarity with the latest scientific experiences and research in the world, a shortage of expert forces in most fields below the bachelor's degree level is also apparent. At present, the academic educational resources in our country are very limited and every year, only 10 percent of the applicants for the national entrance examinations may go to the universities. Due to the limitations of the capacity and resources of the universities in the country, our higher education system is incapable of training the needed expert manpower at the bachelor's degree level. In the opinion of the student applicants to be sent abroad, limiting the students to be sent abroad to those at levels above a bachelor's degree will result in a large number of those applying for entrance examinations losing the opportunity to study abroad. In this connection, the high school graduates say that the authors of the bill on sending students abroad should have also paid attention to creating the necessary resources for applicants with diplomas to study abroad. 'Ali Mahmudi, a high school graduate in mathematics said in this connection: When the resources of the domestic universities are such that they can admit only 10 percent of the participants in the entrance examinations, is it proper to restrict the sending of high school graduates abroad? We ask the educational authorities of the country what they have in mind with regard to the talents which are being wasted outside the doors of the universities? In my opinion, the failure to extend the educational resources to high school graduates inside and outside the country means the spread of hidden unemployment and false, nonproductive and service jobs in the society.

Requirements of Applicants to Study Abroad

We pointed out that according to the new requirements for sending students abroad, as stated in this bill, single women with bachelor's degrees may no longer study abroad. According to Article 3 of the bill on sending students abroad, men with bachelor's and higher degrees will be sent abroad with consideration for the capacity of the universities in the country and the currency resources. In this connection, the female applicants for studying abroad believe that, considering the shortage of specialized manpower, especially in fields that are needed by the society, sending only married women with bachelor's degrees who are accompanied by their husbands will not only place a futile burden on the higher education and cultural institutions of the country, but will prevent a stratum of women in the society from obtaining a higher level of education. In the opinion of these applicants, in the long run, such a policy will

not have a very positive effect on the economic and social situation of our changing, revolutionary society. The authors of the bill on sending students abroad have decided on sending married women with bachelor's degrees accompanied by their husbands with consideration for the existing cultural problems and the moral decadence in the capitalist societies of Europe and the United States. This issue has, under the present circumstances, caused various discussions and opinions. Among them, a group of women with bachelor's degrees believe that, considering the moral standards in the bill on sending students abroad, one of the important articles concerns going through the examination. Therefore, the issue of the importance of the destructive cultural influences of the Western societies on the minds of both male and female students being sent abroad is reduced. In this connection, one of the female students who studies biology said:

"Our present society needs specialized, committed manpower, whether male or female. In this connection, it must be emphasized that the specialization of women in some fields and professions is needed in the present society more than in the past. It is true that the culturally corrupt environments in Europe and the United States have a destructive cultural and educational influence on young people, but, in accordance with the bill on sending students abroad, students are selected on the basis of moral competence. On the other hand, this issue concerns those officials involved in sending students abroad choosing countries, as far as possible, in which students will not be affected by such cultural and moral influences while these students become familiarized with the latest scientific and technical experiences and gains. Therefore, the authors of the bill on sending students abroad should reconsider the note on sending women with bachelor's degrees accompanied by their husbands."

Opinions of the Higher Education Officials

In order to become familiar with the procedure for the implementation of the new bill on sending students abroad and respond to the weak points of this bill, we spoke to a few higher education officials and representatives of the Majlis. First, Dr Shari'atmadari, a member of the supreme council on the cultural revolution, responded to our questions in this area. In connection with the goals and necessity of sending students abroad, he said: "The issue of sending students abroad must be examined from several angles. The first issue is that in our university programs, there are fields that have not grown in a fundamental form and we lack sufficient specialists in these fields. In our opinion, these fields must exist in the curriculum and our society is greatly in need of experts in them."

He added: "Another reason for sending students abroad is the limitation in the capacity of our universities. At the present, in agricultural, medical, technical and engineering fields, the resources of our universities and higher education centers are limited and because of these limitations we cannot admit more applicants to study in the universities. Hence, every year, we must send a group of students abroad."

In connection with the levels acceptable for sending students abroad, he added: "Applicants to study abroad must be selected, as much as possible, from among those who have completed undergraduate work in the country, have become accustomed to the culture and traditions of the society and are able to resist the false values of the West. This group must be able to differentiate between scientific aspects and cultural issues and prepare themselves to serve the country."

Ebrahim Esrafilian, the spokesman of the committee on cultural and higher education of the Majlis, also said in an interview with us concerning the goals of the general policies for sending students abroad: "We try to send students abroad at levels at which there are fewer opportunities for them to study in the country."

He added: "As the imam said, we are trying to reduce our dependence as soon as possible and eliminate our needs so that in the near future we will be needless of sending students abroad."

10,000

CSO: 4640/580

PAKISTAN

REPORT DESCRIBES ETHNIC TENSION, VIOLENCE

Calcutta SUNDAY in English 12-18 May 85 pp 14-17

[Report by M. J. Akbar]

[Text]

It takes as long, they say, to travel from Orangi to Karachi as it once took to get here from Dhaka. That sentence, bland and mildly inaccurate at one level, intricate and poignant at another, contains a world of definitions about our partitioned and repartitioned subcontinent.

Karachi: The census, as we in India know only too well, can be a dangerous form of knowledge. According to the tabulations of 1981, the population of Pakistan's richest, most cosmopolitan and most volatile city was 5.1 million. Nobody believes this. A figure around seven million is more credible, but of course no one can be sure. The truth is difficult to face, its consequences could go beyond control.

Population represents power. If numbers and percentages provoke bitter anger, it is because the figures measure out hope and influence. Karachi is the premier city of Sind, but you can't find many Sindhis in this teeming port metropolis which is the nation's economic brain and industrial heart. Even twenty per cent is too high an estimate for the Sindhi population of Karachi. Nor does the Sindhi compensate this imbalance of population by a dominant control over the city's wealth. Both the strength of numbers and the confidence of finance are with outsiders; and as for the third side in the power triangle, the government, the Sindhi has long been alienated from the military-bureaucracy nexus which has dominated Pakistan for so many years of its existence.

In fact, even the Pathans, who have spilled across from the mountainous western borders of Sind, are more powerful in Karachi than the Sindhis. Estimated now at about a million strong, they have a complete stranglehold over the transport system. They can immobilise Karachi the day they want to; nothing moves without their consent. And now they have been bolstered by the refugees; an uncounted number of the 3.5 million Afghans seeking refuge in Pakistan have slipped into Karachi. And brought with them a new element in the equation—sophisticated weapons.

But if Karachi is dominated by any one group, it is the immigrants from the northern heartland of India, the Urdu speakers. They are now described by two labels. The first, and the major section, are the *muhajirs*: those who crossed over in the wake of partition from the cities and villages of north India. They were an aggressive and progressive element in the early days of Pakistan, quickly filling the gaps in trade, bureaucracy and social services like health and education left behind by the departing Hindus. In fact, in the early days of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan the *muhajirs* were considered the virtual rulers of Pakistan. Time and the arrival of martial law eroded their sway as political power slipped gradually into the hands of Punjab, where of course it has now become firmly entrenched. From the very beginning, the Urdu speaking migrants were kept out of west Punjab, which was reserved largely for the brethren from east Punjab. Sind was given the burden of housing the Urdu-speakers. No Sindhi was allowed any share in the evacuee property in Sind, which was handed out to the *muhajirs*. This is only one of the resentments which are boiling over now, a generation later.

And then, in the 1970s, came the second migration—of those who could not reconcile themselves to Bangladesh. They have been christened Biharis. Once again there are no exact figures of how many Biharis have settled in Sind, but if there were a million and-a-half Biharis in east Pakistan at least a million must have come west by now. There was a qualitative change in the character of the first and second migrations. For the first group, Pakistan was a dream; the second had to force their way into the country. The Biharis were the great unwanted: they were called scum in Bangladesh and pariahs in Pakistan. The nation they had sought to preserve in 1970 and 1971 now turned its back on them, unwilling to pay the price of its published ideology. After 1971, the Biharis had no illusions left. The civil wars of the 1940s had driven them

from their birthplace; the civil war of 1971 uprooted them from their adopted Dhaka. And now, instead of compassion and welcome, they suffered injury and insult. People who are trapped in a blind alley develop their own, distinct characteristics. The Biharis had nowhere else to go. This is where they would have to make their last stand. And on their own terms, the terms of a community which had decided that it would not be defeated again. They brought with them what one observer called the ethos of East Pakistan, an unwillingness to accept an arbitrary status quo, the tension of a community which had been thrice displaced in one lifetime: the determination of a survivor who had watched in pain his home being set to torch. And they had also learnt that sometimes survival depends not only on faith and grit, but also on the ability to make a good Molotov cocktail.

With each immigration, Karachi's demographic map had changed. In Pakistan, political power has often been determined by street power. In the old days, it was only the Sindhi and Baluch workers living in the slums of Lyaris who could be counted on to mobilise for political action. Gradually, new centres of power grew up. There came Lalukhet and Golimar (now christened Liaquatabad and Gulbahar) as the underprivileged among the Urdu speakers massed into Karachi to find livelihood. It was Lalukhet which could, on any day, put 10,000 people on the streets; it was Lalukhet which first stood up against Field Marshal Ayub Khan. And after 1971, Karachi witnessed the creation of Bihari strength: Orangi. This became the third nerve of Karachi. And if Lalukhet was bigger than Lyari, then Orangi was bigger than Lalukhet.

The sea cuts off Karachi to the south, but there is only a desert and a horizon to the north: the city can stretch as far as it likes in that direction. At the foot of the bald, treeless hills which build up into the Kirthar range which separates Sind from Baluchistan, the new township of Orangi has taken shape. "*Apni madad aap karo; hukoomat kuch nahin karegi* (Help yourself; the government will do nothing)." That was the motto which created Orangi. The administration was corrupt and indifferent at worst, cool at best. Drains and sanitation came thanks largely to local initiative and help from social workers. For each favour from the municipal authorities, bribes had to be paid. And then there was the insult. Without employment or offer, the Biharis employed for their livelihood on crafts like sewing, turning out shirts and *kurtas* at subsistence rates. And a few, of course, banked on the oldest profession in the world. The cynical young did not have much use for the great rhetoric of religion and nationalism, not after the way they had suffered during the collapse of the last great idea, Pakistan. They wanted to survive, to prosper, to live with pride. And they were eager to answer the taunts they had had to live through for so long—when all that the Karachite wanted from Orangi was either a *kurta* for ten rupees or a girl for fifty.

The traffic of Karachi is notorious: from Orangi to the heart of the city could take hours, which is why the Biharis joke that they have not come any nearer Karachi despite their migration from Dhaka. The pressure of population would have been sufficient to choke the streets in any case, but the drivers seem to be out on a strangling mission. Karachi counts its wounded from traffic accidents in hundreds—every month. It is not as if the Pathan drivers want to live up to some bloodthirsty ideal, or that they are greedy capitalists who swat pedestrians like flies in their race for profit: they have their problems too. The buses are owned by *sardars* who demand a high return from the driver and the conductor, who have to first meet the flat daily rate and then can share a percentage of the over-

flow. The system is not oriented towards safe roads, particularly since the police are on the side of the bus owners, sharing the sense of power over the city and dividing the loot. The problem has now escalated to the point where one of the first decisions made by the new "partyless" chief minister of Sind, Syed Ghous Ali Shah, was to order strict enforcement of traffic laws and authorise a new action plan on traffic management.

The worst culprit, typically, is the mini bus. This is not an ordinary two colour bus; it is richly caparisoned, as if it was a war horse leaving for battle rather than a vehicle for the more mundane business of ferrying people. On 15 April, at the Nazimabad Chowranghi near the Sir Syed Girls College, in a predominantly *muhajir* area, a mini bus driven by Jan Mohammad ignored the traffic lights and ploughed into a group of college girls, killing Bushra Zaidi, severely injuring her sister Najma Zaidi (she was still in Abbassi Shaheed hospital a fortnight later) and hurting three more girls. So confident are they that a bribe, if not a wink, will ease matters that Karachi's bus drivers are not particularly bothered about accidents. But on 15 April, they were taught a lesson.

Bushra Zaidi was the fifteenth girl from Sir Syed College to have been killed by rash bus drivers. It was the last straw. The students erupted. They blocked the roads, and burnt every private bus in sight. The police came down heavily on them, but the incident set off a fuse causing multiple fires across the city, as the riot turned into a communal battle between the Biharis and the Pathans. Lalukhet rose, and the Pathan-dominated police killed people in firing. Pathan gangs now began retaliating against Biharis and their institutions. And then they laid siege to Orangi.

Orangi is ringed by Pathan settlements. While the Biharis live in the bowl in the centre, the Pathans occupy the hillsides with which they are traditionally familiar. Of course this is not a hard and fast rule: many localities have mixed populations, as for instance Banaras Chowk (so named because it was started by weavers from Banaras; the power of sentiment can stretch from the Ganges to the Indus). It was at this chowk that a confrontation took place when Pathans began attacking Biharis getting off from buses. Bukhari Colony and Sector L of Orangi were attacked by Pathans. A full scale communal war had begun in a country which had been created in the presumption that there would be no more communal riots, now that Allah's followers had been provided with their separate geography.

Telephones are not the only way in which people communicate information. There are few telephones in Orangi, but there are poles. Biharis sent their signals by clanging on these poles; the sound was the alert call. And in Sector L they did not surrender. Not only did they confront the better-armed Pathans, but by the 17th they had turned the tables. What helped them do that was their secret weapon: the *kofta*, an acid based homemade bomb. And of course there was the familiar Molotov cocktail. It was now the turn of the Pathans to feel threatened. It took three days before the army and paramilitary forces forced an uneasy calm on Orangi.

"This is the beginning of the end," said the man who had spent a long life in community service with the Biharis. He was 75, but still very alert and very active. He had seen partition, then worked in east Pakistan before coming west after the creation of Bangladesh. Perhaps his depression deepened his pessimism; nations neither begin nor end without tremendous upheavals. But he had his thesis. Islam was not

sufficient to glue together a nation, he now believed. One God, one Prophet—yes; always yes. But when were all Muslims ever one nation after the passing away of the Prophet? Nor would the army be able to hold it all together. "The real beginning was in 1965, when the war exposed the hollowness of the Pakistan army. 1971 resulted because the Bengalis realised that the army was a paper tiger. Now the third round has begun!"

Was he reading too much into an incident of social strife which is common enough on the subcontinent? Is the communal divide in Karachi an example of just big city mania, or is it symptomatic of a process stretching all over South Pakistan? The strains on Pakistan's unity have existed for some time now, but is the evolving political structure helping to heal the fissures or deepen them? To the west and north of Karachi lie the answers: in Baluchistan and in the villages of Sind. Both have revolted in the past—Baluchistan in 1974 and Sind in 1983. In 1983 Pakistan shivered as the earthquake threatened its roots. What is the mood of Sind in 1985?

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PAKISTAN

REPORT ON INTERVIEW WITH ZIAUL HAQ

Calcutta SUNDAY in English 12-18 May 85 pp 18-33

[Interview with President Zia-ul Haq by M. J. Akbar]

[Text]

It was during dinner, after the interview, that, accidentally, in President Mohammad Zia-ul Haq we saw a rare side of his personality. He has a daughter who is ill. Anxious for her father's attention before going to sleep, she came and disturbed him at the table. With great love, patience and sympathy, the doting father persuaded the daughter to go to bed on her own. And then, his attention back to the dining table conversation, he once again became the President who has to survive in a maze of contradictions—many of which are his own creation.

General Zia treads on thin ice. This may not be apparent immediately, since the General has shown that personal charm and political dexterity can be a devastating combination. It is, indeed, with some amazement that the world has watched that thin, slippery ice hold up despite the constant tramp of the military boot. But there is awareness among the ruling elite of Pakistan that things have gone too well for too long. Like good military strategists, after having successfully engaged and outmanoeuvred the enemy for eight years, they have prepared the escape route. The problem was a difficult one. The army had to be sent to the background, but with the strings still in its hand; and civilians had to be brought to centrestage without letting the heirs of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto take charge.

The solution: if you can't beat the system, change it. Since the political parties which had been opposing military rule, and in particular the Pakistan People's Party, were likely to win any election, hold an election without them. General Zia first organised a referendum to ensure his own future for five years. Though the President denies it, there is enough evidence to show that the vote in the referendum was less than fair. Still, the facade was created. This was followed by "partyless" elections to the National Assembly where the turnout was better—and consequently disastrous for some of the President's most trusted ministers, who were badly defeated. But still, an Assembly had been voted in. However, even this "partyless" Assembly handed the President a rebuff when it defeated General Zia's nominee for Speaker, though it did endorse the General's choice for Prime Minister, Mohammad Khan Junejo, a Sindhi. But the moot question is: can President Zia get away with this hybrid form of democracy? Can this "partyless" system survive the inevitable pressures, particularly if martial law goes (as has been promised by both the President and the new Prime Minister)? President Zia discussed these and other issues in a long interview with M.J. Akbar at Army House, Rawalpindi, where he lives.

Q: Mr President, in the first week of July it will be eight years since you took over power. In 1977, nobody gave you even eight months. To what do you attribute this rather long spell in power?

A: Short spell in power (laughs). I must confess that even I am surprised. I will be very frank with you: I think it is primarily due to God and I hope you believe in Him. And after God, it is the sincerity of my colleagues, the efforts of my compatriots and the confidence of the people of Pakistan. You can't fool eight-and-a-half million people for eight long years.

Q: As Abraham Lincoln said. How much would you thank the army for your survival?

A: For everything: the stability, back-up support, raw hands, expertise, technical assistance, legal assistance ... all the time.

Q: Plus, of course, the infrastructure with which to control the opposition.

A: No, that is not the job of the army. That we did through whatever we picked up in political ability as to how the opposition should be controlled: it is a political process, not through the army's hands.

Q: How much of your support came from the US?

A: Er ... It doesn't look nice saying this, but as much as the Soviet support came to India (laughs).

Q: There is this theory that after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan your position was strengthened immensely and that gave you the momentum for the next five years.

A: The situation in Afghanistan has contributed: there is no doubt about this. It has not contributed to my prestige, or the stability of the government: no. But the situation in Afghanistan has a direct reflection on the situation in Pakistan. Pakistan as a country has received far greater attention than it used to get prior to 27 December 1979. As a result, and for other good reasons, we got help and assistance from America in the form of military hardware, which we purchased ourselves, and in the form of economic assistance for which we are grateful to them and any other political support, has helped us to stand up. But you can't say that Pakistan has been stable only because of America's help and only because of the Afghanistan situation.

Q: Was the stability of your regime viewed as a necessary component of the stability of Pakistan, by the USA?

A: I do not know (about the USA). But we felt that Pakistan needed stability. Pakistan needed continuity. And we thought that when we had not succeeded the first time when holding elections in 1977 and when we failed again in 1979 then we (had to think of other options). It was a very deliberate decision of the government that in order to give Pakistan a true place in the Islamic world, and more so in the context of the region, we had to have continuity and stability. And the only way to have stability and continuity was to have a longterm programme of four or five years and then see how to go on. And we have followed exactly that course.

Q: The five years are over now, and you are beginning what is clearly a new experiment.

A: For the next five years.

Q: Shall I be cynical and ask if it is only a variation of the old experiment?

A: Your asking me will not make the difference. Nor will my reply make the difference. What will make the difference is what emerges out of this experiment. And that will be visible, as bright as the daylight. Then there will neither be a conjecture on my part nor an assumption on your part. That's what you should see.

Q: Today, on 29 April, who is more powerful: you or Prime Minister Junejo?

A: It's not a question of who is more powerful, because we are not enemies.

Q: No. Neither are Mr Zail Singh and Mr Rajiv Gandhi. But we know who is more powerful in terms of executive authority.

A: Then your analysis is not correct. Because you can't have a competition going on between the Prime Minister and the President, as to who is more powerful. What you should be knowing is that under a given system, or a Constitution, how do you come about or how do you solve the difficulties? We have gone through a lot of difficulties, and we feel that we have come across a solution to the problem where the Prime Minister and the President, both belonging to the same school of thought, same group of people, should live happily, and should have defined areas of activity. And that is what we have been able to achieve.

Q: But are you, in the next five years, gradually going to ease yourself out from direct decision-making?

A: According to the Constitution, which we have amended, the Prime Minister is supposed to be the chief executive, and the chief executive's powers I need not define. The President is supposed to be the head of the state; the responsibilities of the head of the state I need not define. And the two amongst themselves should devise, like we have done for the last one month, how to live happily and govern the country.

I must confess that even I am surprised (at having stayed in power for eight years)...I think it is primarily due to God...And after God, it is the sincerity of my colleagues, the efforts of my compatriots and the confidence of the people of Pakistan. You can't fool eight-and-a-half million people for eight long years.

The judges (Justices Yaqub Ali and Anwar-ul Haq) were very much with us—as long as the goodies were there.

Mr Gorbachev didn't threaten Pakistan. His attitude was very correct, very firm and he has a lot of understanding. He listened to me very patiently and whatever he had to say, he spoke very firmly.

Q: Well, in that case would you advise me next time, to interview Mr Junejo?

A: Please. And ask him as many questions as you like (laughs).

Q: Since yours is in a sense an evolving polity, I am sure people in both countries would like to know a clear answer to the last question. The danger, of course, is that your bureaucracy might get cross-eyed in the interregnum: one eye looking at the Presi-

dent's office and the other looking at the Prime Minister's office.

A: That is a basic dichotomy, a duality. When there is none, people will look to the right direction for the right guidance.

Q: How much of guidance would you be giving?

A: Only that much for which I have the discretionary powers. As for the rest, I am bound by the advice of the Prime Minister.

Q: Including on when martial law should be lifted?

A: No. That is my prerogative. But even there I have said I will abide by the advice of the Prime Minister. I only said it yesterday.

Q: Your opponents allege that the army is moving into the background because this year is going to see the beginning of the economic downturn and the problems are going to mount. Pakistan is importing wheat after a long time. And it might be a good idea to let the civilians take the car: for many of these problems. How do you respond to such criticism?

A: This is in bad taste. Because the economy is not going to the dogs. The economy is as good as it was two years ago. Yes, we have some difficulties. And we have gone through these difficulties for the last nine years. The economy is as strong as it was, it is as stable as it was before. In fact the strongest part of the economy is the cotton crop and nearly 1.2 million bales of cotton have already been sold. This is the largest bargain Pakistan has made in many years.

Q: International prices of cotton were, however, lower this year.

A: Yes, prices were lower this year, but what difference does that make? We would get about the same amount. Even if we have to import two million tonnes of wheat—two million is my target, we think about 1.2 or 1.5 million tonnes of wheat would be sufficient. But even if we have to do this it is offset by the cotton sale. So the economy is as good, is as stable. The growth this year is nine per cent; four per cent in agriculture. The remittances are down a little bit, by 12 to 14 per cent, but then what difference does it make? The remittances could be compen-

sated by the greater generation of resources within the country. So, look at it in any way you like: ignoring the political aspects of the protection of the economic situation, which may have been done with certain intentions, the actual reality is that the Pakistan economic situation has never been so good as it is today.

Q: Do you think that the army can actually be removed from the power structure in Pakistan now?

A: In what sense?

Q: In the sense that: take Bangladesh. General Ershad says the army cannot be removed from the power structure of Bangladesh. It has to be given some place, whatever the new system might be.

A: Our thinking is that the army has no place in the power structure. The army has its own responsibilities, and the army has no role in the political life, other than what all the armies in the world have: guarantee the external boundaries and safeguard the security of the country from internal subversion.

Q: Let me think aloud: would 1989 see another referendum where a representative of the army might want to sit in the presidential chair?

A: If he wants to, he won't sit through a referendum. He will sit through a martial law.

Q: In other words, back to the old practice.

A: If you are thinking that way; yes, that can happen, because there is no guarantee that there will be no martial law. Unless we really take certain measures, and by that, time eliminate all possibilities of martial law. But you can't say that there will be no referendum—whether I hold it, a new President holds it, the Prime Minister holds it. Because the referendum is a process which we have now institutionalised in the form of making it a part of Pakistan's revised Constitution.

Q: In the last referendum: both observers from all over the world and people who were here don't believe that you got much of a vote.

A: That is as white a lie as a lie can be white. Totally. Utter disregard to the reality. It was a very successful referendum. We are not concerned what people outside say.

Q: I am also talking of people within Pakistan.

A: Within Pakistan there is a group of people who do not recognise the elections. Are you going to trust this handful of people who say that we are not even recognising the elections where the turnout has been 53 per cent and 57 per cent? No sane man will do so, but they are saying they do not recognise the elections. What do we do? Shall we accept their version, or shall we accept the reality? The reality of the referendum was that it was one of the most successful referendums that we have had, where there was a landslide (in my favour).

Q: May be the landslide result led to some of the doubts?

A: No. The doubts are a self-creation of interested parties, and a few of them are foreign journalists, unfortunately.

Q: The foreign hand?

A: No. I don't say foreign hand. But foreign journalists have their own ideas: why a referendum should be held. They think they know the Pakistan problem better than anybody else and therefore they have gone and seen a polling station where 10 people have turned out so they have declared that the whole of Pakistan (has a similar polling percentage). An individual who is related to a very important broadcasting corporation was having a loose tummy on that day.

Q: BBC?

A: (Laughs). And he collected figures here and there and the next morning he wrote accordingly. It's not right. It's not correct. You can go and ask anybody in Pakistan what is the correct position: what has been the turnout in the referendum, national elections, and the people will tell you.

Q: Did you protest to the BBC?

A: No, I haven't. I don't believe in that. India has done it. I haven't.

Q: We believe in protesting.

A: I don't (laughs).

Q: Given Pakistan's experience with civilian governments, from the Fifties to Mr Bhutto, do you think civilians can be trusted to provide good government?

A: They must. It is the political leadership of the country (which) by and large must come from the civilian politicians. It is only rarely that a military man comes up.

Q: Yes. It is even rarer when a military man survives.

A: Yes. It should not be taken that if Zia-ul-Haq has survived, everybody else will survive. We must find out political leadership among the civilian population.

Q: But the very first thing almost that you had to do after the creation of the National Assembly was, in fact, give a sanction to corruption by saying that the law on election expenditure will have to be waived because you don't want legislators to begin with a lie. Now, the people who have spent the money, don't you think they are going to recover it through corruption?

A: No. This much I will assure, that they won't. And they have spent that money, and in my opinion—I have talked to a number of them, those who have honestly confirmed that yes, they have spent that much of money—I don't think they are that type who will try to recover the money, because they have plenty themselves.

Q: But people with plenty of money always like another good investment.

A: Haan (yes). But I don't think this time we will let them invest in this way. In fact, the same is true with India. But what will happen in the future? We have given this task to the National Assembly—those who have spent this money and now realise that perhaps it was not the right method—please we will find an answer to this, because this is not right. This is neither democracy—leave

alone the Islamic aspect of it—and we hope we will find some way out.

Q: *How far can you trust a civilian government to have the same commitment to Nizam-e-Mustafa that you have?*

A: More. Because, after all, they are as good Muslims that I am. In fact, I have drawn my inspiration from some civilian scholars. And I see no reason why the Pakistan civilian politicians should not be able to guide the country according to Islamic thought and process.

Q: *Air Marshal Asghar Khan has just made a statement saying that the anti-Bhutto forces removed Bhutto for elections, not to replace him with Nizam-e-Mustafa.*

A: But Air Marshal Khan is not a throughbred civilian (laughs). He is ex-air force.

Q: *I was merely suggesting that he might reflect another trend in Pakistan's public opinion.*

A: No. These are a few diehards; stubborn, rigid individuals who have certain opinions. And we respect them even for that. After all, why should not a man believe that in Pakistan Islamic values are nothing; we should have secular values. Let him say so.

Q: *What is the philosophical base of the system that you are trying to create?*

A: I am trying to establish, not create. While I confess that in running a country you ought to have tools, you ought to have institutions. I am also convinced in my mind that you can do it better without the so-called political parties. Particularly the political parties of the type that we had and we have. I am trying to see that individuals dedicated to the country, who have been selected rightly from the electorate, having come into the Assembly in a strength of 237, need not be grouped into five, ten, 20, or one or 30 parties. They should be able to act in unison over defined subjects, over policies, and should be able to give the guidance to the country as a collective body rather than

groups of individuals belonging to various schools of thought according to the principles of the political parties. This is what I am trying.

These (people like Air Marshal Asghar Khan) are a few diehards; stubborn, rigid individuals who have certain opinions. And we respect them even for that. After all, why should not a man believe that in Pakistan Islamic values are nothing; we should have secular values.

I do not say that India hasn't got a democracy... You had a good crop of politicians, you had stability, you had continuity. You had an accepted leadership. But you have allowed the democracy of the Third World or a developing country to become something where everything is allowed: the goondaism, the violence...

Q: Yes, but you know in the Speaker's election, it became virtually a two-party contest.

A: No. You have to look at the background of the Speaker's election. Because the same house (which) was divided over the Speaker's election, was unanimous—not a majority, but unanimous—over the mandate to the Prime Minister. So you have to see the reason why.

Q: Why did they split on the Speaker?

A: They split on only two counts. One, perhaps, in the losing contender they saw something of the past which they did not want to be reminded of; he was in the past an elected representative of a nominated party in the Shoorā.

This is one reason. Number two reason, is that the loser—I have great regard for him and I was very sorry that a man of his experience and knowledge could not become the Speaker, but I was trying to analyse the reason, and the second reason is that maybe he has annoyed a few people. And the third one was, which played an important role, that here was a body which had just emerged, and it had 40 active schoolmates, from one school. It was this group which led the so-called revolt, if I may call it so, and got 190 votes. It is just one of those things which happens.

Q: Is there a parallel in Islamic polity or Islamic history for such a system?

A: No. Unfortunately we have no precedent of any kind of this nature. We have to devise our own formula.

Q: But President, depending on the individual more than the organisation, or the party, seems to me to be a very short route to chaos.

A: No. It may be (instead) a proper route to stability and continuity. Because, you know, these individuals, for the first time, at least in our experience of 37 years, each individual has won or lost in the elections only because of his personal merits. It had nothing to do whether he belonged to the Pagaro group, or this group or that. Maybe his clan came into it, or his family, or his own money. But there are many, I tell you, who have won these elections with no money, no background of any family, carried out their campaign on a cycle, and have won the elections by thousands of votes. So it is a phenomenon. The more you study it, the more you realise that it has a potential. But where I have not been able to strike, since we have no precedent, is how to make even those members who are in unison in their thinking connect to a particular time and policy. This is what these days the Prime Minister, myself, my colleagues, MPs—we are all engaged in this. And I hope we'll be able to find an answer to this.

Q: You have banned political parties. But in the real world they continue to exist.

A: Yes. Because we have not applied the banning so strictly, so severely.

Q: So, as political entities they continue to function. So if tomorrow martial law is lifted—not a very hypothetical situation—and Miss Benazir Bhutto comes back to Pakistan, how will you tackle the political consequences?

A: According to the Constitution which is to be revived.

Q: This is the 1973 Constitution with amendments.

A: Yes, with amendments. And in this regard, we made no amendments. The original text says when martial law is lifted the political parties will have to be revived. It is at that time, when the political parties have to be revived, that the government has to think on what lines they should be revived. At the present moment, the parties are not only dormant, they are banned, and therefore when you want to revive them, they just can't be allowed to revive by themselves in any form or another. Parliament will have to pass a law about its functioning. Assuming that the Parliament revives the parties, it will have to revive them under some law. And it is under that law that we will have to regulate the activities of the political parties. And if Miss Benazir Bhutto comes, and she wants to revive this political party on the lines of the Parliament's law she is most welcome. We have nothing against her.

Q: How do you assess the PPP's strength today?

A: The PPP is no force of significance today. And it will never be so. Because a political party which builds up on terror, on goondaism, on all the aspects of life which are condemned, where there is no respect by a politician for a politician, where the respect for the family has gone down the drain, it can never come up. Under the circumstances, where we have enhanced the values of life much higher than those that were practised generally, I don't think it has any chance.

Q: But it may benefit from the unpopularity of martial law or the unpopularity of the army.

A: If martial law was unpopular, Mr Akbar, you and I wouldn't have been sitting and talking (laughs). It is as simple as that.

Q: We might have been talking in India?

A: (Laughs) Perhaps I might have come there to explain why martial law has been so unpopular!

Q: Justices Yaqub Ali and Anwar-ul Haq in public seminars have just made the point that martial law is unpopular in Pakistan now.

A: That's what they think. They are not the public opinion.

The army (in Pakistan) has no place in the power structure. The army has its own responsibilities, and the army has no role in the political life... It should not be taken that if Zia-ul Haq has survived, everybody else will survive. We must find out political leadership among the civilian population.

Q: Yes, but they are not irresponsible people?

A: They are judges. And judges only see through the logic of reasoning, and not of reality. They should give verdicts on law, not on politics which they do not understand. But in any case, I have respect for both of them. And whatever they have been saying is not political thinking, but a consequence of their experiences. One went out (from the Supreme Court) because of the referendum, and the other went out because he didn't

want to sign the new oath. And now the same people who were doing something else (earlier) are saying something else (after leaving their chair). This is a dichotomy in their thinking, and not in the people.

Q: Yes, but their dichotomy has been created by the arbitrary nature of executive authority which they have had to face.

A: Oh, no, no. They were very much with us—as long as the goodies were there (laughs).

Q: Will you remain a serving general after martial law is lifted?

A: Unlikely. The President of Pakistan can be a general, but I think a serving general who has a responsibility otherwise may perhaps not be able to hold two offices. I have to give up one job to hold the other.

Q: Do you think Pakistan will ever have a democracy like India?

A: A natural democracy like India. My ideals are very high. I do not say that India

hasn't got a democracy. You have developed—you are lucky, lucky in many ways—you had a good crop of politicians, you had stability, you had continuity. You had an accepted leadership. But you have allowed the democracy of the third world or a developing country to become something where everything is allowed: the goondaism, the violence; what we have a little bit, you have there. That's not my idea. We want to have a purified Islamic democracy. And I hope one day I am able to achieve this and then offer it.

Q: As long as it is a democracy for the people. How would you describe the present situation: as a quasi-democracy?

A: A total democracy. Except for myself, and the name of martial law—martial law is only in name, not in practice. We have a civilian elected Prime Minister, we have a military man elected President, and we have all the Assemblies functioning. It is the normal form of government in any democracy: not Islamic to that extent, but it is functioning, and I think it is as near to a democracy as it could be. Except the name of martial law is there, and I am there in uniform.

Q: Can democracy ever be divisible? It is a bit like virginity: either you are a virgin or not a virgin. Either you are a democrat or not a democrat.

Pakistan is nowhere near a nuclear option... Pakistan has no intentions, no desire, of opting for a military use of nuclear weapons or nuclear devices.

A: Yes, there could be a degree of democracy. You could have a democracy of a particular type. Do you think the Communist states are not democratic? They say so. It may not be democratic from our point of view. So, you can be democratic to the extent that you like; there is no black and white; there are stages. And we are going through a stage where we are reaching close to where you are.

Q: To begin talking about India, I thought the starting point might well be to ask you how you liked the 40 kgs of sweets that Mr Bhandari brought for you from our Prime Minister recently.

A: (Laughs) Did he bring 40 kgs?

Q: That's what we read in the papers.

A: I don't know. I got a couple of nice packets of barfi. He must have brought for distribution to other friends. I am not sure about this, but I am very grateful for the most delicious few packets that I received.

Q: Does the sweetness of the packet reflect the state of Indo-Pak relations now?

A: It was certainly very thoughtful, and a good gesture. And halwas and mithais make a lot of us in Pakistan and India join hands together. It was a good visit. All said and done, Mr Bhandari's was a very good visit. It was a successful visit and I think it did have that little opening to come back to the old times or talking together.

Q: Do you notice any change in Delhi's attitude after Mr Rajiv Gandhi has taken charge?

A: I noticed even when I was there at the time of the last rites (of Mrs Gandhi) and I had a very frank, intense and forthright dialogue with Mr Rajiv Gandhi. And I felt that I was talking to the right man, and perhaps India and Pakistan have good, bright prospects in the future. And I am seeing it coming.

Q: How different is Mr Rajiv Gandhi from his mother in terms of attitudes to Pakistan?

A: I have been asked this question by a large number of people...

Q: We are all desperate to know.

A: But I have never said... (laughs). The difference is visible in my mind, but I don't think it is right to compare a son with his mother.

Q: Do you think it might embarrass the son?

A: Even otherwise. I think as a gentleman, it is not right.

Q: What was the content of your talks with our Prime Minister?

A: In New Delhi we talked of how to revive the confidence, because we both agreed that if we start from the areas of conflict we won't get anywhere: Why don't we start on the areas of agreement? And there are a large number of places where we have areas of agreement. And we thought of how to create, how to generate confidence because our crisis is a crisis of confidence and perceptions. So we agreed that we should be forthright, frank. No one should meddle in the internal affairs of any country, like our experience in 1983 (during the Sind agitation) when the Indian government was making announcements on Pakistan's happenings. Nor, I assured him, was there truth in Pakistan being involved in the internal affairs of India by aiding the Sikhs in the east Punjab. There is no truth in that. And we thought that India and Pakistan being such typical neighbours of the developing Third World, there should be much more close, direct contacts between the leaders of the two states.

Q: We hear often of "good intentions": but was there anything specific discussed to promote them?

A: Yes, we revived the talks. We agreed that the joint commission must meet, and people must start going and coming; trade must start. We discussed all those points and I think they will all be coming up in the next ministerial conference.

Q: Can you offer some specific suggestions that would go a long way to improving relations? What would you like India to do?

A: What I would like from India, and what I would like Pakistan to do also. There is only one fundamental requirement. If that is achieved, the rest will fall in place. And that fundamental requirement is: faith and trust. If I have no trust in my neighbour, nothing can change my heart. The same thing is true with the neighbour on the other side. There must be a tremendous number of actions: there must be exercises to find how to generate confidence. There is confidence among the common people, but there is perhaps less confidence at a higher level; and perhaps there is none at the top level. Unless there is confidence at heart at the government level, and the people to people level, you can't improve relations.

Q: I am talking of specific instances. Why don't we remove the communication barriers? In any case, nobody can stop the smuggler from going through each other's borders.

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I've only worked
as part of my
duty. What
destiny has in
store, what
history has in
store, it has
never bothered
me. What I've
done is to do my
job honestly and
sincerely and to
the satisfaction
of my
conscience. And
the day I think I
don't have this, I
would no longer
be on the scene.

A: We suggested this. This point is right on top of the agenda of the joint ministerial commission. We have done many things unilaterally, but we found that the results were not there unless the other side reciprocated. So, now, having done things unilaterally—not once but half-a-dozen things—we found the results were not forthcoming. Now, since we have institutionalised this, and the committees have been formed, let those committees take the decisions, and the governments will implement them.

Q: Why don't you unilaterally allow us to keep a correspondent?

A: Here in Pakistan? You are most welcome. There are already two.

Q: Just the Telegraph and Sunday.

A: Have two, not one. Have two.

Q: I have a Pakistani friend, who makes popular TV programmes, Anwar Maqsood. If Doordarshan invited him to do a script, would the Pakistan government have any objections?

A: None whatsoever.

Q: You met our Prime Minister twice. Did you notice any change in him, before the elections and after the elections?

A: The first time when I met him it was on a sad occasion. The second time when I met him, he had not only won the elections but he had left it far behind, and was looking for greater glories in the future. I found him a

very confident and a very friendly and a very amicable personality.

Q: The more important question is: Do you think that he would like to keep a war option open in his thinking?

A: Internally, what is in his mind, one can't say. But from the talks I could see that, perhaps like me, he would also like to ignore the military options. That is the feeling I get.

Q: So, you feel confident that the no-war pact you could not sign with his mother might be possible now?

A: Very much so. Now it is very much on the cards.

Q: There is now a third meeting between you and Mr Gandhi on the agenda of intentions. How far have both governments progressed towards that?

A: I think the two drafts have been merged, and it is just a question of giving the final touches. And if the political will is there to sign, I think it can be ready in a day. (Turns to Mr Abdul Sattar, former Pak ambassador to Delhi). Am I right, Mr Sattar? ("Only two or three articles are left," is Mr Sattar's reply.) (We are talking of) the no-war pact and the treaty of friendship; the merger of the two.

Q: Do you envisage a summit this year?

A: This year the summit is to take place in any case, in connection with SARC.

Q: I was asking about a bilateral summit.

A: No bilateral summit is yet planned. But if it is planned in the next meeting of the joint ministerial commission, or the foreign ministers conference, at least from Pakis-

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confidence
among the
common people,
but there is less
confidence at a
higher level, and
perhaps there is
none at the top
level.

tan's side we'll have no objections.

Q: Is a trip by Rajiv Gandhi to Pakistan on the cards?

A: That's a different thing. We have extended a very sincere invitation to the Prime Minister to visit Pakistan anytime he feels like. Maybe, when he is going abroad somewhere, if he can drop in. Or, when he is returning (from a trip abroad) he can drop in for a few days. It will give a lot of encouragement and will be a very good gesture. We are waiting for it, and the chances are that perhaps he might do that. There is no confirmation yet, but I think we are expecting that perhaps he will respond positively.

Q: Did you feel any apprehension of a border conflict either during Operation Bluestar or during Mrs Gandhi's assassination during those days of tension?

A: No, no, no. The talk of war clouds was only on your part. Here it was all sunshine (laughs).

Q: Why did Pakistan Television show the film on Operation Bluestar knowing reasonably well that it would incite people and create problems in Punjab?

A: Pakistan Television did not make that film. It was shown elsewhere, on foreign television. And Pakistani public had to be kept informed. Pakistan TV acquired this film and showed it.

Q: The suspicion there was that the film was meant for the Sikhs across the border as it was to show Pakistanis.

A: We know we have an audience in east Punjab. But there is a much larger number of (video) cassettes available in east Punjab (about these events) than what Pakistan TV started off.

Q: Many people seem to believe that you are hiding Bhindranwale somewhere in Pakistan.

A: (Laughs) They have to do a lot of searching then!

Q: Among the Akali demands is the control of all gurdwaras by the SGPC. You have gurdwaras here too. Has the SGPC approached you to ask for control of the gurdwaras?

A: The gurdwaras and the Akali Dal are controlled by the Pakistani auqaf.

Q: But the SGPC wants to take over control.

A: No. In our country, how can they? They can cooperate with them to fulfil their requirements, but the SGPC has no jurisdiction in Pakistan.

Q: Would you allow Sikhs to keep arms in the gurdwaras?

A: In Pakistan?

Q: Yes.

A: They can keep their kirpans if they want to. But I see no justification of carrying (any other) weapons inside Pakistan. We don't allow our own citizens to do so.

I shall pray that India can resolve the Sikh problem, because Sikhs, as you know and I know it, are a very emotional people. They feel they have been hurt.

You can't have a competition going on between the Prime Minister and the President, as to who is more powerful... We feel that we have come across a solution to the problem where the Prime Minister and the President should live happily.

Q: Would you have sent the army into the Golden Temple?

A: This is a very hypothetical question, and I don't think I am competent to answer.

Q: Actually, I didn't put it rightly. What I will ask is: Would you send the army into a mosque if you believed a mosque had become an armed fortress?

A: It happened in Kaa'ba. But there is always a price to be paid, and one can resolve a problem, but the price that is paid has far-reaching effects. And if I have to do (consider such an option), I'll avoid it like anything.

Q: So you see far-reaching effects in India?

A: I pray...I don't think I should comment on this. I shall pray that India can resolve the Sikh problem, because Sikhs, as you know and I know it, are a very emotional people. They feel they have been hurt. From what we know from reading in your press, not through my contacts of which I have none—

Q: Do you want to repeat that?

A: Yes, yes. My only contacts are the pilgrims whom I meet with the greatest of pleasure. So, in the interest of the country's unity: I am sure the government of India is doing its best and I am not there to advise them—I think the sooner the problem is resolved the better it will be.

Q: Doesn't the GHQ in Pakistan ever get the temptation to intervene in Punjab?

A: Why should we? We are not children. We are all grown-up people; mature to the extent that any government should be; responsible people. We don't work on whims or emotions. I think cold-blooded logic is the way to...good-neighbourly relations.

Q: Do you believe that religion is a good enough basis for a nation's unity, given the record of the last 40 years?

A: Not only this. Mr Akbar, I do not agree with all the logic you have given in *The Sign Within*.

Q (Laughs) That's incidental to Indo-Pak relations.

A: In my mind it is religion only. When I say religion, I mean Islam, the *deen* of Islam. The *deen* of Islam is the only focal point on which Pakistan's everything must revolve.

Q: Then why did Bangladesh go away? They also believe in Islam and the deen.

A: It was not a fault of Islam. We didn't follow Islam. It was known as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. But we did everything un-Islamic, with the result that one part fell apart. You can't blame Islam for this; you can blame the way we followed it. And it is our effort now to follow Islam in the right manner. And you see how what *Pakistaniat* has been sprouted among this 85 million people. It was never there before.

Q: In that case, you accept that it is theoretically sound to say that Sikhism can form the basis of a separate nation.

A: No, you've got me wrong. India is a secular state, and therefore religion from that point of view makes no difference.

We are not in competition with India. Indian resources, Indian requirements are much greater. But we would certainly urge India that having exploded one device, please don't opt for a military weapon because it is not good for mankind as such; leave alone our region.

Pakistan is an Islamic state. You asked a question of President Ershad (the reference was to the SUNDAY interview): Is Bangladesh an Islamic state? And his answer was no. You haven't asked me this question...

Q: That is because I know your answer is yes.

A: Yes, very much yes. Because this is an Islamic state, right in, right out. And therefore in our context deen, not religion, the deen of Islam is the main fulcrum. But you can't say that since I believe so, I'm also applying this to (the) Akalis. That's your business to judge.

Q: Another question follows: if you say that Islam can form the basis of nationalism and Pakistaniat: Now one of the persons who fought for Pakistan before 1947 is G.M. Syed, and today he is a champion of Sindhi nationalism. How has he become disillusioned with the Pakistan that has been created?

A: Mr G.M. Syed is not against Pakistan.

Q: I'm talking of the Sind nationalist leader G.M. Syed.

A: Yes. He is for Jiye Sind (Live, Sind). Sind could be a high-degree province of Pakistan. He is Jiye Sind. He gives priority to Sind, everything to Sind. Sind must exist; Pakistan may or may not exist. But he is not as such against Pakistan. I met Mr G.M. Syed. And I think in 1940 if we didn't have him (in the Muslim League) perhaps we would not have been as successful. So a man who believed in one thing: unless he goes wonky...And Mr G.M. Syed is a very capable, competent man. I've met him, I've talked to him. I think he's very sane. There must be something in him: Somebody must have done something to annoy him. Personalities get upset over small things, and one should look into the heart of the man who was all (the) time a Pakistani. Why is it that he now talks about Sind?

Q: You should answer that.

A: Yes, I'm trying to find it out. And I will find it out. We found it out in Wali Khan; we found it out in Ghaffar Khan. I told them, I said they were as patriotic as anybody could be. Why should we doubt their integrity? Yes, if they want to follow a different policy. They want Pakistan to be secular and I want Pakistan to be Islamic. We can have differences of opinion. But that does not mean we should start shouting and calling each other unpatriotic and disloyal, and that he's an agent of...No. I think they're as good Pakistanis as any Pakistani can be. But the difference of opinion in Islam has a tremendous place in one's freedom of thought. And Islam encourages freedom of thought. So everyone of them, whether he is a Jiye Sind or whether he is NDP, whether he is a Red Shirt, has all the freedom to start thinking in whatever form they may like, except on the ideology of Pakistan. On that there is no compromise.

Q: As far as relations with India are concerned: the other potential area which could lead to a crisis is the nuclear option which suddenly seems to have become much more real. In fact, the language is deteriorat-

ing and we have been hearing of the doctrine of terror and counterterror. The blunt question is: How near is Pakistan to a nuclear option?

A: Nowhere near. The blunt answer to this is that Pakistan has no intentions, no desire, of opting for a military use of nuclear weapons or nuclear devices. Pakistan wants to acquire nuclear technology purely for peaceful purposes. We have no other intentions at all, whatsoever. And we have offered to India half a dozen proposals of ensuring nuclear non-proliferation in this region, of ensuring that we don't step out or we don't go beyond our limits, so that we can have a better cooperation. But so far, we have not received any response.

Q: If India decided to go in for nuclear weapons, how long would it take you to achieve parity?

A: We are not in competition with India in this respect. Nor in any other respect. We are not in competition with India. Indian resources, Indian requirements are much greater. But we would certainly urge India that having exploded one device, please don't opt for a military weapon because it is not good for mankind as such, leave alone our region.

Q: Are you contemplating specific talks on the nuclear option?

A: We are in continuous touch on this matter.

Q: I know the Pakistani position on arms. But to keep that large subject within manageable proportions...The Indian suspicion on the arms question lies in, for example, your purchase of 155 millimetre howitzers or heavy tanks which would not be operational on the Afghan border and therefore could only be used against India.

A: How do you say so? The 155 millimetre howitzers, or the SP guns are primarily meant for a country which has no roads, no infrastructure. They are semi-automatic machines which are good only for areas where there are no proper infrastructures and this is on our west, not on the east. So they are meant for the west and not for the east.

Q: But the heavy tanks and the heavy guns would be really useful only in a war against India.

A: No, not necessarily. They are as good: you can use them anywhere you like. But our priority is west, not east.

Q: How do you react to the US under secretary for defense Fred Ikle going to Delhi to offer India arms?

A: As long as it serves the purpose of bringing India and the United States of America in a better frame of mind, Pakistan would be too pleased. And Pakistan has always said that Pakistan is not concerned with what the United States gives to India, and what India gets from the United States of America: that is a result of the mutual requirements of the two countries. Who are we? And we expect the same (attitude from India). But unfortunately, every time we get something (in arms), we also get a statement from India, which is not right. So from that

point of view, please, for the government of India, for the people of India, if (there is) anything that you want from anywhere you like, as long as you think it's good for your own defence, who am I to say (anything)? But follow the same policy elsewhere. What is good for the goose must be good for the gander.

Q: Has the gander spoken to the Soviets on the potential purchase of arms?

A: No, no, we haven't. But you have talked to the gander, now you are talking to the goose.

Q: Would it be right to say, that by and large the issues of territorial claims which the two nations have on each other are paper arguments, and are not strong enough to create the kind of tensions they did in the Sixties?

A: Except the question of Kashmir. Except Kashmir, which is the only big hurdle. Except for that, I think the rest is nothing.

Q: Yes, but Kashmir has been the subject of two wars.

A: But in Kashmir also India has accepted that Skardu will be part of this part of Pakistan. That has been so. There has been no ceasefire line, no demarcation, no United Nations observers... So, it has only been kept as a lever on paper. And at the right time, I'm sure that India will say all right, we agree.

Q: But then Kashmir is the issue, isn't it?

A: Yes, that is the issue, it is a volatile issue. And therefore I have said that if you start talking about Kashmir, then somebody will suggest let's fight the fourth war, which I will not advocate. So, let us put Kashmir aside. We'll talk about this Kashmir, we'll see how best we can solve (the problem) peacefully. We don't have to fight a war to solve it. How many of the territorial rights and disputes between France and Germany, between Germany and Austria, between the various parts of the countries of Europe, between America and South America, how many times they have solved it. They don't have to go to war everytime. And I'm sure we can resolve the question of Kashmir provided we create understanding and goodwill by agreeing on the areas of agreement, and then coming on to the areas of disagreement. Kashmir is a volatile area of disagreement. Let us leave it. We'll touch it at the appropriate time. Let's build more confidence, let there be more exchange of people, thoughts, journalists, everybody should come and go.

The Pakistan People's Party is no force of significance today. And it will never be so.

Sind could be a high-degree province of Pakistan. He (G.M. Syed) is for Jiye Sind. He gives priority to Sind, everything to Sind. Sind must exist; Pakistan may or may not exist.

Q: Are you hearing similar language from Rajiv Gandhi on this subject?

A: I am sure, I am sure! We have not talked to that extent but what little we have been able to do...I thought his gesture in Moscow by sending Mr Bhandari here and starting off the joint ministerial commission is a good omen.

Q: In Moscow you met Mr Gorbachev also and there was a lot of controversy on whether he was tough with you and threatened Pakistan or not. Now let us have it from you. Was he tough? Did he threaten Pakistan?

A: (Smiles) No, he didn't threaten Pakistan. His attitude was very correct, very firm and he had a lot of understanding. He listened to me very patiently and whatever he had to say, he spoke very firmly. The message was very clear.

Q: What was the message?

A: The message was that he felt Pakistan was interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and he said 'lay off.' And I told him that we are not in it, but we cannot stop shouting. And this is the difference of opinion between the two sides. But we both agreed that this is an area where you can't resolve it militarily. It has to be resolved politically. Mr Gorbachev agreed one hundred per cent. And we said, well, then why not allow the United Nations effort to succeed? And he said he would give his support.

Q: To the UN effort. Which means that the chances of the June talks—

A: Are very bright.

Q: You have an ambassador of the United States here. Mr Deane Hinton, who does tend to make statements on the internal affairs of Pakistan.

A: No. Mr Hinton has been very correct. We have other ambassadors who sometimes get out of step.

Q: The Indian ambassador?

A: No, the Indian ambassador has been...He did once or twice, but by and large he has been all right. But we have other ambassadors who have been talking out of turn.

Q: The Soviet ambassador?

A: Yes, we have had a couple of statements from him. But Mr Hinton has been very correct.

Q: But when he says that the MRD should have its head examined?

A: Generally, a diplomat doesn't talk (about such things). But if he is talking in a particular context then of course I think we should give him the right to express his opinion on a particular point of thought, not on the internal affairs of the country.

Q: The other controversial statement that you are reported to have made is on Biharis in Karachi. Did you describe them as 'Bhikaris'?

A: No, no. I was misreported (laughs heartily).

Q: Will the Orangi clash between Biharis and Pathans cause a setback in bringing the Biharis from Bangladesh?

A: Perhaps, I'm not sure. But it certainly has left a very deep mark that, with all this effort, and without any cause, an area can be up in arms for nothing and 38 people's lives have been lost. Why?

Q: Are the Biharis to blame for it?

A: It happened in their area, where they are in a majority. And it has left us in a very dejected mood. The individuals who fought for Pakistan, who did so much for Pakistan, having come into Pakistan, they are now indulging in hooliganism.

Q: They feel a sense of depression, that they don't feel like equals in Pakistan.

A: They have as many rights as anybody else. They have elected their own representatives in the provincial Assembly from the Orangi area. They have all the liberties, they have all the freedoms, they are as good as citizens as anyone else in Pakistan. Why? I do not understand—honest to God. I can see the incident happening in Liaquatabad, I can see the incident happening in Nazimabad. A bus runs over, you can see the crowd getting rowdy, burning the bus, taking out the driver, you can see all this. But without any incident, 38 people being murdered, butchered in the next-door area; unnecessarily. What is the reason?

Q: Perhaps you should put them in separate nations. (The President laughs) The charge of Punjabi domination, however, over the non-Punjabis of Pakistan is believed the non-Punjabis.

A: No, no, there is no such thing.

Q: And the army is considered to be the spine of Punjabi domination over Pakistan.

A: No, these are all conjectures, or statements coined for a particular purpose by outside agencies.

Q: How do you view the state of the opposition at the moment?

A: They are active, they will surface when martial law is lifted and political activity is generated. A certain amount of opposition would be there.

Q: You would not stop the Bhutto Begums from coming to Pakistan?

A: We never, never stopped them (from) going abroad. This is their country. Let them come any time they like. They asked to go abroad, and they have gone. We have not stopped them. They can come back tomorrow.

Q: Who in the opposition, do you feel, has the most credibility now?

A: I think there is no such thing as an organised opposition as yet. There are individuals who are talking. And the situation will emerge more clearly when political life gets more organised. Once the Assembly starts functioning, the Prime Minister, the new government, new Assembly, have dug in their heels. They're new, fresh, they have not had their first session as yet. Then I think the situation will emerge. But we can see that a certain amount will happen—perhaps (by people in search of) cheap popularity, who will criticise the government only for the sake of doing so. Such opposition is everywhere, in your country, in my country, elsewhere. It is those types of

people who will emerge. But I foresee a very small number of such things. The majority are sane people, and I think they will go along well with the Prime Minister's plans and policies.

Q: How do you keep in touch with the popular mood? How do you know what the people think?

A: I spend 18 hours working and my difficulty is that I find it hard to clear my files, which I get in bundles from the foreign office, from others, from the Prime Minister. I clear it only at night. During the daytime I talk, meet the people. Various delegations come to me and I meet the common man. I have my eyes and ears open.

Q: Is there a certain time kept apart for meeting the average Pakistani?

A: I'm as accessible as a President can be.

Q: And isn't the common man terrified of the chief martial law administrator?

A: This you should ask somebody else.

Q: Do they repeat the jokes that they have about you to you?

A: Yes, sometimes I hear about it (laughs).

Q: One last question which has a bearing on the first one, which is you have lasted here for eight years through a very difficult time, do you ever think of yourself as your nation's man of destiny?

A: I have never given it a thought, honest to God. I've only worked as a part of my duty. What destiny has in store, what history has in store, it has never bothered me. What I've done is to do my job honestly and sincerely and to the satisfaction of my own conscience. And the day I think I don't have this, I would no longer be on the scene.

Pakistan has always said that Pakistan is not concerned with what the United States gives to India, and what India gets from the United States of America: that is a result of the mutual requirements of the two countries.

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